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ABSTRACT
The mortgage interest deduction is an incredibly popular, politically
well-supported and hugely expensive tax incentive. Yet economic
studies consistently show that the mortgage interest deduction fails
to advance its fundamental purpose. It does not increase the rate of
homeownership. On the contrary, to the extent that it is effective in
influencing human behavior, it does so by inflating home prices and
encouraging borrowing against equity. These effects – inflated home
prices and excessive borrowing – contributed to the economic crisis
of 2008. In the years leading up to the crisis, Americans spent
billions of tax dollars further inflating a dangerously unstable
housing bubble. Even if we had the will to change this policy, we did
not have the means. The mortgage interest deduction is insensitive to
market conditions and resistant to change. These attributes make the
mortgage interest deduction bad policy. Rather than perpetuating this
costly deduction, Congress should phase it out in its entirety and
replace it with targeted tax incentives designed to stimulate the
housing market only when the market is weak. Future tax incentives
should avoid the structural flaws that caused the mortgage interest
deduction to fail by focusing on market responsiveness, timing and
flexibility.
*

Adjunct Professor, Master of Professional Accounting - Taxation Program, Michael
G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington. J.D. 2003, Yale Law School.
LL.M. - Taxation 2010, University of Washington School of Law. After completing her
LL.M. in Taxation, and prior to purchasing her first home, the author endeavored to
calculate the value of the mortgage interest deduction she would receive following her
first year of homeownership. Approximately twenty frustrating minutes later, she
determined that the answer was zero dollars, for reasons described in more detail in Part
II(C)(1). She bought the home anyway and looks forward to next year, when she will
become one of the 54 percent of American homeowners who do receive a financial
benefit from the mortgage interest deduction. She would like to thank Ian Ayres, Jessica
Clarke, Andrew Dyer, Robert and Catherine Morrow, Elizabeth Morrow, Matthew
Stock and Kimberly Zelnick for their encouragement and comments on this article.
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While the vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis were
years in the making, it was the collapse of the housing bubble . . .
that was the spark that ignited a string of events, which led to a fullblown crisis in the fall of 2008.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report

1

INTRODUCTION
Tax incentives for homeownership are some of the most expensive
subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code. The mortgage interest
deduction, the exclusion of gain from the sale of a primary residence
and the deduction for real property taxes together cost $183.83 billion
annually in lost revenue, and that number is growing rapidly.2 The
mortgage interest deduction alone is a $119.75 billion annual tax
expenditure.3 Tax incentives for homeownership have been allowed
because Americans have long believed that widespread homeownership
is a critical feature of a strong economy and a valuable part of the
1. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, xvi
(2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter
FCIC REPORT]; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY AND U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEV., REFORMING AMERICA’S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 31 (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforming%20
America’s%20Housing%20Finance%20Market.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY AND HUD
REPORT TO CONGRESS] (“The housing finance system must be reformed . . . . We
allowed its flaws to go unchecked for too long, contributing to a financial collapse that
has strained families, decimated communities, and pushed the economy into the worst
recession since the Great Depression.”).
2. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2010 299-301 (2009), http://www.gpoaccess.gov
/usbudget/fy10/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter 2010 FEDERAL BUDGET] (estimating that for
2011, the mortgage interest deduction was a $119.75 billion tax expenditure, the
exclusion of gain upon the sale of a principal residence was a $39.53 billion tax
expenditure and the federal income tax deduction for real property taxes paid on homes
was a $24.55 billion tax expenditure); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-09-769, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION: DESPITE CHALLENGES
PRESENTED BY COMPLEX RULES, IRS COULD ENHANCE ENFORCEMENT AND GUIDANCE 6
(2009) [hereinafter GAO-09-769] (reporting that the total amount of mortgage interest
deduction claimed by taxpayers increased from $323 billion in 2001 to $437 billion in
2006, an over 35 percent increase in 5 years).
3. Id. at 299-301 Table 19-1.
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American dream. And yet, the 2008 economic collapse was sparked by
overinvestment in real property.4 Homeowners were not establishing
economic security by building equity in their homes, but were
borrowing against the perceived increased values of their homes through
home equity lines of credit, the interest on which was deductible.5 Real
estate “flipping” was viewed as an arbitrage opportunity, rather than the
incredibly risky, transaction cost heavy, undiversified investment
scheme it is. Mortgage lenders assisted borrowers in taking out huge
debts, with both sides of the transaction assuming that rising home
prices would guard against the risk of default.6
In the wake of the economic crisis, Americans are beginning to
question the assumed value of homeownership incentives. This article
advances a broader challenge to homeownership subsidies and argues
that the Internal Revenue Code significantly over-incentivizes
homeownership in statistically ineffective and economically
unsophisticated ways.
The mortgage interest deduction is an extremely expensive
incentive that is ineffective at increasing rates of homeownership,
nonresponsive to economic conditions, resistant to change and
structurally flawed. It inflates housing prices even in times of
unsustainable appreciation. It should be repealed and replaced with
4. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that the economy was
destabilized when consumers purchased homes that were too large and too expensive);
Id. at xxvi (describing the “failure to effectively rein in excesses in the mortgage”
market as a principal cause of the economic crisis).
5. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (“Homeowners pulled cash out of their
homes to send their kids to college, pay medical bills, install designer kitchens with
granite counters, take vacations or launch new businesses. They also paid off credit
cards, even as personal debt rose nationally.”).
6. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6 (Angelo Mozilo, CEO of Countrywide
Financial described to the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission that “a ‘gold rush
mentality’ overtook the country during these years, and that he was swept up in it as
well: ‘Housing prices were rising so rapidly—at a rate that I’d never seen in my 55
years in business—that people, regular people, average people got caught up in the
mania of buying a house, and flipping it, making money.’ [Consumers and lenders were
encouraged by the surface prosperity in the real estate market]” and “[i]n fact, some of
the largest institutions had taken on what would prove to be debilitating risks. Trillions
of dollars had been wagered on the belief that housing prices would always rise and that
borrowers would seldom default on mortgages, even as their debts grew.”).
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targeted, time-limited and economically-responsive homebuyer tax
credits. These tax credits should increase homeownership incentives
when the economy is weak, decrease them when the economy is strong
and eliminate them when housing bubbles threaten to undermine
economic stability.
Part I of this article describes the mortgage interest deduction and
presents data strongly indicating that it fails to increase rates of
homeownership, increases housing prices and increases borrowing
against equity. Part II identifies the attributes of the mortgage interest
deduction that make it fail. Part III presents a proposal to entirely phase
out the mortgage interest deduction and replace it with targeted and
time-limited homebuyer tax credits aimed at promoting economic
stability in the real estate economy. Finally, this article concludes with a
discussion of why now is the time to eliminate the mortgage interest
deduction.
I. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FAILS TO ACHIEVE ITS
GOAL OF PROMOTING HOMEOWNERSHIP
For as long as America has had an income tax, taxpayers have been
allowed to deduct the interest they pay on their mortgages. When the
United States imposed its first income tax in 1913, all interest was
deductible.7 That policy remained in effect until the Tax Reform Act of
1986. Under the terms of the Act, the deduction for most forms of
personal interest was phased out over five years.8 However, the
deduction for “qualified residence interest” (i.e., the mortgage interest
deduction) was retained.9
7.
8.

GAO-09-769, supra note 2, at 3.
Andrew Schreier, New Rules on Deductibility of Home Mortgage Loan
Interest, 2-AUG PROB. & PROP. 34 (1988); see also id. at 3.
9. Schreier, supra note 8. When the deduction was phased out for all other forms
of personal interest, it was retained for active business interest, taxable investment
interest, passive activity business interest, estate tax interest, educational loan interest
and “qualified residence interest” (here referred to as mortgage interest), all of which
remain regular itemized deductions. Regular itemized deductions are itemized
deductions other than miscellaneous itemized deductions. While miscellaneous
itemized deductions may only be deducted to the extent they, in aggregate, exceed two
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, regular itemized deductions are fully
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The goal of the mortgage interest deduction is a popular one—to
increase the rate of homeownership in America. The reason cited by
Congress in 1986 for preserving the mortgage interest deduction was the
promotion of homeownership.10 Congress believed that encouraging
homeownership was an important policy goal and retained the mortgage
interest deduction in an effort to advance that goal. In a government
publication explaining the Tax Reform Act of 1986, for example, the
Joint Committee on Taxation, a committee including Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, described the reason for
preserving the mortgage interest deduction as furthering the policy goal
of promoting homeownership. It stated: “Congress . . . determined that
encouraging homeownership is an important policy goal, achieved in

deductible by any taxpayer who itemizes. A taxpayer should itemize if total itemized
deductions exceed the standard deduction. For 2012, the standard deduction is $5950
for single taxpayers and married taxpayers filing separately, $8700 for head of
household taxpayers and $11,900 for married filing jointly taxpayers.
10. Introduction: The Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers,
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV. - 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – VOLUME ONE, 10
(2011),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2010arcmsp1_taxreform.pdf
[hereinafter
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT INTRO]; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-4011, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF HOUSEHOLD
DEBT, 24 (2010) [hereinafter JCX-40-11] (“Congress described the reason for
preserving a deduction for home mortgage interest as furthering the social policy goal
of promoting home ownership: While Congress recognized that the imputed rental
value of owner-occupied housing may be a significant source of untaxed income,
Congress nevertheless determined that encouraging home ownership is an important
policy goal, achieved in part by providing a deduction for residential mortgage interest.
Therefore, the personal interest limit does not affect the deductibility of interest on debt
secured by the taxpayer’s principal residence or second residence, to the extent of the
basis of the principal residence (or second residence).”); Christian A.L. Hilber & Tracy
Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and its Impact on Homeownership Decisions
2 n.5 (unpublished draft Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hilber
/hilber_wp/hilberturnerv024.pdf (“While the federal income tax put in place by [the]
16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allowed for the deduction of any interest paid
and did not distinguish mortgage interest, the intent of keeping mortgage interest
deductible in the 1986 Tax Reform Act was to promote homeownership. In a 1984
speech regarding his tax reform agenda, President Reagan stated he would ‘preserve the
part of the American dream which the home mortgage interest deduction
symbolizes.’”).
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part by providing a deduction for residential mortgage interest.”11 In an
effort to advance the policy goal of homeownership, mortgage interest
was saved from the phase out of the deduction for other forms of
personal interest. The mortgage interest deduction has received
significant public and political support because of the strong belief that
high rates of homeownership are critical to a strong economy and
society, as well as the assumption that the mortgage interest deduction
increases the rate of homeownership.
The current deduction for mortgage interest is provided by Internal
Revenue Code Section 163(h)(2)(D).12 For the interest to be deductible,
the mortgage need not be on a principal residence. It can be used on up
to two homes.13 The mortgage, however, must be secured by a home and
recorded.
Mortgage interest is deductible14 if it is on a mortgage that was:
1)
Grandfathered Debt: mortgage debt incurred before October
13, 1987;
2)
Home Acquisition Debt: debt incurred to buy, build or
improve a home but only to the extent that total home
acquisition debt is $1,000,000 or less15; or
3)
Home Equity Debt: other debt secured by a home, which
can be used for any purpose (including personal

11. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-10-87, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986 263 (2011) [hereinafter JCS-10-87]; see also JCX-40-11, supra
note 10, at 24.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006).
13. Id. § 163(h)(2)(D), (h)(3).
14. Note that special rules will limit the mortgage interest deduction if the home is
rented, if debt on the home exceeds its value or if part of the home is used as a home
office and the taxpayer claims other tax benefits associated with that home office.
15. The total home acquisition debt includes home acquisition debt on the main
home and a second home. For example, if the mortgage on the main home is
$1,000,000, the cap is fully satisfied by that mortgage and no mortgage interest
deduction will be available for the second home. If the mortgage on the main home is
$800,000, all interest paid on that mortgage is deductible and interest paid on the
mortgage on a second home is deductible to the extent it is attributable to the first
$200,000 of indebtedness on that second home. The cap is $500,000 for married filing
separately taxpayers. 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(B).
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consumption) but only to the extent that total home equity
debt is $100,000 or less.16
For taxpayers who qualify, the value of the mortgage interest
deduction is equal to the amount of mortgage interest paid in a year
multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. For 2012, tax rates range
from 10 percent to 35 percent.17 However, since the mortgage interest
deduction is only available to taxpayers who itemize their deductions, it
only benefits taxpayers whose itemized deductions exceed the standard
deduction. For 2012, the standard deduction is $5950 for single
taxpayers and married taxpayers filing separately, $8700 for head of
household taxpayers and $11,900 for married taxpayers filing jointly.18
Thus, a married couple that pays less than $11,900 mortgage interest in
a year and has no other itemized deductions will receive no benefit from
the mortgage interest deduction. If that same married couple pays
$12,000 in mortgage interest and has no other itemized deductions, the
value of the mortgage interest deduction will depend on the couple’s
marginal rate. If the couple’s marginal rate is 10 percent, the mortgage
interest deduction will save the couple $10.19 If the couple’s marginal
rate is 35 percent, the mortgage interest deduction will save the couple
$35. The value of the mortgage interest deduction equals the taxpayer’s
marginal rate multiplied by the amount of mortgage interest paid that is
in excess of the standard deduction.
The mortgage interest deduction is an enormous tax expenditure.20
The United States Office of Management and Budget estimates that

16. The cap is $50,000 for married filing separately taxpayers. 26 U.S.C. §
163(h)(3)(C).
17. Rev. Proc. 2011-52 § 3.01.
18. Id. § 3.11.
19. Assuming the couple has no other itemized deductions, the value of the
mortgage interest deduction equals the couple’s marginal rate of 10 percent multiplied
by the $100 in mortgage interest paid that is in excess of the standard deduction
($11,700 mortgage interest paid minus the forgone standard deduction of $11,600).
20. 2010 FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 2, at 297 (“The Congressional Budget Act
of 1974 . . . requires that a list of ‘tax expenditures’ be included in the [United States
Federal] budget. Tax expenditures are defined in the law as ‘revenue losses attributable
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax
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between the years 2010 and 2014 alone, revenues collected will be
approximately $646 billion less due to the mortgage interest deduction.21
Only the tax subsidy for employer contributions to employee medical
care constitutes a costlier tax expenditure.22 The tax subsidy for
mortgage interest is larger than the subsidies for contributions to 401(k)
plans, IRAs and Keogh retirement plans combined.23 It is more than 16
times costlier than the combined HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax
credits.24
Despite the large associated cost, the mortgage interest deduction
benefits a small number of taxpayers. Only 23 percent of Americans
receive any benefit from the mortgage interest deduction.25 Many
Americans who pay mortgage interest receive no benefit. For example,
in 2005, only 54 percent of American homeowners received any benefit

or a deferral of liability.’ These exceptions may be viewed as alternatives to other
policy instruments, such as spending or regulatory programs.”).
21. Id. All tax expenditure estimates in the 2010 budget and in this article “are
based upon current tax law enacted as of December 31, 2008,” “reflect preliminary
2010 Budget economic assumptions” and attempt to compare revenue that would be
collected in the absence of a tax exception with revenue collected given that exception.
Id. It is important to note, however, that estimates for tax expenditures “do not
necessarily equal the increase in Federal revenues (or the change in budget balance) that
would result from repealing these special provisions” because “eliminating a tax
expenditure may have incentive effects that alter economic behavior” and thus the
amount of the tax expenditure, and “tax expenditures are interdependent even without
incentive effects. Repeal of a tax expenditure provision can increase or decrease the tax
revenues associated with other provisions.” Id. at 298. The Office of Management and
Budget cautions “for this reason, the estimates [of income tax expenditures] should be
regarded as approximations.” Id.
22. 2010 FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 2, at 299-301.
23. The Tax Expenditure Budget (“TEB”) estimates that between 2010-2014,
401(k) plans will constitute a $343,000 million expenditure, Keogh plans will constitute
an $87,000 million expenditure, and IRAs will constitute a $79,000 million
expenditure, totaling $509,000 million ($137,080 less than the mortgage interest
deduction). Id. Table 19-3.
24. The TEB estimates that between 2010-2014, the Hope Credit will be a $24,560
million tax expenditure and the Lifetime Learning Credit will be a $15,730 million tax
expenditure, totaling $40,290 million. Id.
25. David Leonhardt, Why Taxes Will Rise in the End, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011,
at B14.
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from the mortgage interest deduction.26 Owners of less-expensive homes
and homeowners who have built up equity in their homes tend not to
receive any benefit from the mortgage interest deduction because their
potential mortgage interest deduction is less than the standard deduction.
Of the 54 percent of homeowners who do receive a benefit from the
mortgage interest deduction, the amount of benefit is skewed strongly in
favor of high income taxpayers with large mortgages.27
Despite its enormous cost and failure to provide any benefit to
many homeowners, the mortgage interest deduction has long received
enormous political and public support. When the mortgage interest
deduction was saved from elimination in 1986, lawmakers recognized
that few Americans could afford to buy homes outright and saw
subsidizing mortgage borrowing as a way to incentivize
homeownership.28 One Senator described the mortgage interest

26. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 74 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter
2005 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL]; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB NO. 3191,
BUDGET OPTIONS VOLUME 2 188 (2009) [hereinafter CBO PUB. NO. 3191].
27. See, e.g., John E. Anderson, Jeffrey P. Clemens, & Andrew R. Hanson, Tax
Reform and Incentives to Encourage Owner-Occupied Housing: Analysis of the
President’s Tax Reform Panel Recommendations to Convert the Mortgage Interest
Deduction to a Tax Credit 23 (paper prepared for presentation at Closing the Wealth
Gap: A Policy Research Forum sponsored by the Community Affairs Offices of the
Federal Reserve System and CFED, September 19-21, 2006, Phoenix, Arizona) (“over
70% of tax filers did not receive any benefit from the [mortgage interest deduction] in
2002 . . . more than 55% of the estimated [mortgage interest deduction] tax expenditure
went to the 12% of taxpayers with cash incomes in excess of $100,000 in 2004.”).
28. As is explained by Law Professor Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., all policy justifications
for the mortgage interest deduction have been made after the deduction already existed.
The deduction was not created to advance any policy purpose. On the contrary, the
deduction has existed since the income tax was enacted and was simply retained in
1986, when the deduction for other forms of personal interest was eliminated. See
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 236 (2010)
(explaining that “the historical record fails to indicate why Congress allowed a
deduction for personal interest in 1913 [when the income tax was enacted]” but the
purpose did not appear to be promotion of homeownership.). But see supra note 10 and
accompanying text (the purpose of retaining the mortgage interest deduction in 1986
was to promote homeownership).
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deduction as “one of the most sacred parts of the Tax Code.”29 Another
Senator effused, “[t]here is no basic principal in tax law that is more
supported by the American people than the principal that you ought to
be able to deduct interest on your home from your taxes.”30 In a recent
poll conducted by The New York Times, more than 90 percent of
respondents supported the mortgage interest deduction.31 The mortgage
interest deduction enjoys significant political and public support because
of the strong belief that high rates of homeownership are critical to a
strong economy and the entrenched assumption that the deduction
increases the rate of homeownership.
A. DOES NOT INCREASE RATES OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
Despite the overwhelming political and public belief in the notion
that the mortgage interest deduction should increase rates of
homeownership, available data indicate that it does not. Since the
mortgage interest deduction was instituted at the same time as the
federal income tax, we have no direct evidence of how much, if at all, it
initially increased rates of homeownership. We do, however, have data
on homeownership rates in countries with and without mortgage interest
deductions, in states with and without mortgage interest deductions from
their state income taxes, in times when the mortgage interest deduction
has been more and less valuable, and economic projections based on
these data.32 These sources overwhelmingly suggest that the mortgage

29. Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical
Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69
TULANE L. REV. 373 n.123 (1994) (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 14,824 (1986) (statement
of Sen. Pryor)).
30. Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 13,591 (1986) (statement of Sen. Gramm)).
31. Brian McCabe, Despite Benefit Disparities, Middle Class Supports Mortgage
Interest Deduction, N.Y. TIMES FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (July 13, 2011, 4:04 PM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/despite-benefit-disparities-middleclass-supports-mortgage-deduction/ (including polls finding that more than 90 percent
of Americans support the mortgage interest deduction).
32. See Part I(A)(1) (International Comparisons), I(A)(2) (Interstate Comparisons),
I(A)(3) (Time-Based Comparisons) and I(A)(4) (Economic Models).
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interest deduction does little, if anything, to cause people to become
homeowners.33
1. International Comparisons
Despite the tremendous tax expenditure made by the United States
to incentivize homeownership, rates of homeownership are no higher in
the U.S. than in other countries. International comparisons made in
several different time periods find no correlation between mortgage
interest deductions and high rates of homeownership.
In 2000, Professor Roberta Mann compared homeownership rates
in ten developed countries against the level of tax subsidy provided in
each country. She concluded that “[n]o apparent pattern emerges.”34
Switzerland, which allowed a mortgage interest deduction, had the
lowest homeownership rate of the ten countries studied, at 28 percent.35
Australia did not allow a mortgage interest deduction, but had the
highest homeownership rate of the countries studied, at 70 percent.36
Britain and the U.S. both allowed a mortgage interest deduction and had
comparable rates of homeownership.37 However, as Mann explained,
“the maximum subsidy Britain provides for homeownership (about
$4,700) is a third less than the average home mortgage interest
deduction taken by a U.S. taxpayer (about $7,163).”38 The equivalent
rates of homeownership in these two countries thus indicated that a
33. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber, & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz,
Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 (June 8,
2007) (“Evidence suggests, however, that the mortgage interest deduction (MID) does
little if anything to encourage homeownership.”); Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 4
(“Overall, our findings cast serious doubt on the benefits of the mortgage interest
deduction as a policy for boosting homeownership rates, particularly in more urbanized
places and among low income and minority households, who tend to live in the more
urbanized places.”).
34. Roberta Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of
the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1385 (2000).
35. Id. at 1385. Note that while Switzerland permits a mortgage interest deduction,
it includes imputed rental income (the fair market value of living in one’s home) in the
calculation of taxable income.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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more generous subsidy was not associated with a higher rate of
homeownership. Mann concluded that “comparing data from other
countries suggests that the home mortgage interest deduction does not
necessarily impact home ownership rates.”39
In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
compared homeownership rates of various developed countries and also
questioned the efficacy of the mortgage interest deduction. The
bipartisan panel, established by President George Herbert Walker Bush,
was charged with recommending changes to make the tax code simpler,
fairer and more pro-growth.40 However, it was also specifically
instructed by the President to recognize “the importance of
homeownership and charity in American society.”41 Despite the
presidential finger on the scale in favor of tax subsidies for
homeownership, the Panel concluded that tax subsidies had little to no
effect on homeownership rates. It stated, “[a]lthough the deduction for
home mortgage interest is often justified on the grounds that it is
necessary for promoting homeownership, it is unclear to what extent
rates of homeownership depend on the subsidy.”42 Using statistics from
the United States Census Bureau, the Panel determined that in 2005, the
United States had a homeownership rate of 69 percent. This rate fell into
the middle of the range of homeownership rates of other developed
countries that did not provide a mortgage interest deduction. For
example, while Canada’s homeownership rate was slightly lower
(approximately 66 percent), the U.K.’s rate was comparable and
Australia’s rate was higher (approximately 70 percent), even though
none of those three countries allowed a mortgage interest deduction.43
The Panel concluded that the high levels of mortgage interest subsidy

39.
40.

Id.
See Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 § 3(a)-(c) (Jan. 7, 2005),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01
/20050107-1.html (directing the panel to “simplify Federal tax laws,” “share the
burdens and benefits of the Federal tax structure in an appropriately progressive
manner” and “promote long-run economic growth and job creation.”).
41. Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 §3(b) (Jan. 7, 2005), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050107-1.html.
42. 2005 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 26, at 72.
43. Id.
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provided in the United States did not appear to be necessary to ensure
high rates of homeownership.44
Finally, in 2009, the Congressional Budget Office observed that the
homeownership rate in the United States (with its generous mortgage
interest deduction) was comparable to homeownership rates in countries
that did not offer a mortgage interest deduction, including Australia,
Canada and the U.K.45 It speculated that the mortgage interest
deduction’s “effect on home buying may be small because people in
lower-income households – who confront other barriers to home
ownership – benefit less from the deduction than higher-income
households do.”46 Regardless of the cause, the mortgage interest
deduction did not lead to a higher rate of home ownership in the United
States than in other developed countries without mortgage interest
deductions.
For years, scholars both inside and outside of government have
recognized that the American mortgage interest deduction has not
caused the homeownership rate in the United States to be higher than
that of other countries. To be fair, however, international comparisons of
homeownership rates are necessarily flawed. The housing industry is
affected by many federal organizations (including Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) and the
Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) in the United States), by direct
federal grants, by levels of government-owned housing and by the
demographics and social attitudes of its citizens.47 Nevertheless, the
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
CBO PUB. NO. 3191, supra note 26, at 188.
Id.
See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at xxvii (“[F]or decades, government
policy has encouraged homeownership through a set of incentives, assistance programs
and mandates. These policies were put in place and promoted by several
administrations and Congress—indeed, both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush set aggressive goals to increase homeownership.”); Ventry, supra note 28, at 106
(homeownership rates “jumped” following World War II after government
interventions including “a litany of new agencies and emergency stabilization policies
that infused credit into housing markets, underwrote government-insured mortgages
and reversed rates of foreclosure by purchasing defaulted loans and then reinstituting
them under more favorable terms. These programs reshaped the residential housing and
mortgage markets by institutionalizing long-term, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans;
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international data is persuasive because it is consistent with interstate
data, time data and economic projections.
2. Interstate Comparisons
Interstate comparisons look at the rates of homeownership in
various U.S. states and compare them to the total housing subsidies
provided against both federal and state taxes in those states. These
comparisons indicate that the mortgage interest deduction is ineffective
at increasing rates of homeownership.
Recently, for example, economics professors from the London
School of Economics and Kansas State University teamed up to analyze
homeownership data collected from 1984 to 2007.48 They noted that,
while residents of all states qualify for the same mortgage interest
deduction against their federal income tax, individual states have
different policies regarding deductibility against state income taxes.
When state and federal subsidies are considered together, states
including California, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts and North
Carolina have much more valuable combined mortgage interest
deductions (since they have high state income taxes against which
mortgage interest deductions are allowed) while other states including
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and
Wyoming have much less valuable combined mortgage interest
deductions (since they have no state income tax and no mortgage
interest deduction against state taxes).49 By looking at combined state
and federal tax subsidies for mortgage interest compared to
homeownership rates across the various states, these researchers
measured the effect of larger total tax subsidies on homeownership
rates. They concluded that the level of tax subsidy for mortgage interest
“has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of
homeownership, not even for the highest income households . . . who
establishing considerably higher loan-to-value ratios; and by creating a vibrant
secondary mortgage market. These innovative federal housing policies stabilized the
housing sector during the Depression and fueled a postwar housing boom.”); id. at 118122 (describing how federal agencies including the FHA, Fannie Mae and the VA
“reshaped housing and homeownership in the United States”).
48. Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 3.
49. Id. at 1.
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tend to receive the greatest tax breaks from this feature of the tax
code.”50 There was no association between the generosity of a state’s
mortgage interest deduction and its homeownership rate.
An earlier study had indicated that states with more generous
mortgage interest deductions might even have slightly lower rates of
homeownership. That study, completed in 2002 by researchers from
Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research,51
compared homeownership rates for states with high tax subsidies against
rates for states with low tax subsidies using data collected from 1990 to
2000.52 It noted that “[p]laces with a bigger subsidy tend to have slightly
lower homeownership rates” than states with a smaller subsidy.53 This
association might occur because more generous tax subsidies make
homeownership more valuable and can, therefore, drive up home prices
(a principal known as price capitalization, which is described in more
detail below). Regardless, while a slight counter-association between tax
subsidies and homeownership rates was noted, these researchers also
concluded that “there is essentially no relationship” between the relative
value of tax subsidies and the rate of homeownership in a state.54 The
researchers identified as their “basic point” the conclusion that a more

50.
51.

Id. at 16.
History of NBER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org
/info.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2011) (“The NBER is the nation’s leading nonprofit
economic research organization. Eighteen of the 33 American Nobel Prize winners in
Economics and six of the past Chairmen of the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers have been researchers at the NBER. The more than 1,000 professors of
economics and business now teaching at colleges and universities in North America
who are NBER researchers are the leading scholars in their fields. These Bureau
associates concentrate on four types of empirical research: developing new statistical
measurements, estimating quantitative models of economic behavior, assessing the
economic effects of public policies and projecting the effects of alternative policy
proposals.”).
52. Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1979, Oct.
2002), 38 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=343800.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id.
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generous mortgage interest deduction is not associated with a higher rate
of homeownership.55
Interstate studies indicate that states with more generous combined
state and federal mortgage interest deductions do not have higher
homeownership rates than their low subsidy neighbors.56 There is no
indication that increasing the value of the mortgage interest deduction
increases the rate of homeownership, or that decreasing its value
decreases the rate of homeownership.
3. Time-Based Comparisons
Time-based studies look at the rates of homeownership at various
times in U.S. history and compare them to the relative value of the
mortgage interest deduction at those times. Time-based studies similarly
indicate that the mortgage interest deduction fails to promote
homeownership.57
While the mortgage interest deduction has allowed a taxpayer who
itemizes his deductions to fully deduct the mortgage interest he pays on
mortgages up to $1,100,000 since 1987,58 the value of that deduction has
changed over time. For example, since the mortgage interest deduction
is an itemized deduction, it is more valuable when the standard
deduction is small. Since the value of the deduction is based on the
amount of mortgage interest paid multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal
rate, it is also more valuable when marginal income tax rates are high.
Changes in tax law have significantly affected the value of the mortgage
interest deduction over time. For example, the net state tax subsidy for
55. See id. (concluding that “home mortgage interest deduction doesn’t have much
to do with the homeownership rate.”).
56. Id.
57. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
58. While the mortgage interest deduction was saved from the phase out of the
general personal interest deduction in 1986, the $1,100,000 cap went into effect in
1987. JCX-40-11, supra note 10, at 23-24 (“When the deduction for personal interest
was phased out generally under the 1986 Act, deductibility was nevertheless retained
for interest on debt on the taxpayer’s principal residence and second home. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 . . . modified this provision to permit a
deduction for interest . . . on home equity debt of up to $100,000, and on home
acquisition debt of up to $1 million.”).
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homeownership roughly doubled between 1984 and 2007 in Arizona,
New York and Wisconsin.59 This amount of variance should indicate
whether more valuable mortgage interest deductions increase
homeownership rates. Yet, while researchers studying homeownership
rates and the value of the mortgage interest deduction at various periods
in American history found that higher tax subsidies can affect certain
individual buying decisions,60 they did not find that higher tax subsidies
were associated with higher overall rates of homeownership.61
Researchers who conducted a time-based study in 2010 concluded that
the mortgage interest deduction is an ineffective policy to promote
homeownership.62
An earlier time-based study, completed in 2002 by researchers from
Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research,
controlled for variation in mortgage interest rates over time and
59.
60.

Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 1.
Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, found that higher tax subsidies slightly
increase home purchases by high income taxpayers living in suburban areas while they
decrease home purchases by moderate-income taxpayers living in cities and have no
effect on low-income taxpayers. They attribute this finding to the differential impact of
price capitalization. The mortgage interest deduction makes homeownership more
valuable and in higher demand. The suburban real estate market can respond to the
increased demand by increasing the supply of housing (building more houses). The
urban real estate market cannot respond to the increased demand by increasing housing
supply (cities often have more restrictive zoning laws and less available raw land).
Since the urban real estate market cannot increase supply to meet the increased demand
for housing motivated by the mortgage interest deduction, it responds to that increased
demand by increasing home prices. Moderate-income taxpayers will be less able to
afford a home in a city, and their rates of homeownership will drop. Because lowincome taxpayers generally receive no benefit from the mortgage interest deduction and
generally live in low-priced homes, they are unaffected both by the mortgage interest
deduction and the potential price capitalization resulting from the deduction.
61. Id. at 23; see also William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber, & Seth StephensDavidowitz, Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, TAX NOTES 1171,
1180 (2007) (“Time-series evidence in the U.S. provides little reason to believe that the
[mortgage interest deduction] has a substantial influence on homeownership. The value
of the deduction increases with the inflation rate and independent increases in the value
of itemization (such as increases in tax rates). Despite substantial variation in the values
of inflation and itemization – and thus the [mortgage interest deduction] – over the past
40 years, the homeownership rate has barely budged.”).
62. Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 23.
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similarly concluded that time periods with more generous mortgage
interest deductions are not associated with higher homeownership rates.
It looked at homeownership rates in the United States from 1965 to
2000.63 While the study recognized that the value of the mortgage
interest deduction is higher in years when taxpayers pay more interest
(due to higher mortgage interest rates), it controlled for variation in
mortgage interest rates. Since high mortgage interest rates are also
associated with high housing prices and high housing prices can
separately affect homeownership rates, the study controlled for changes
in interest rates while analyzing the data.64 It measured the relative value
of the mortgage interest deduction based on inflation and the percentage
of taxpayers itemizing their deductions. It concluded that “[i]ncreases in
[tax-subsidies for homeownership] cause the homeownership rate to
increase, but the effect is slight and insignificant. A one percent increase
in the subsidy rate causes homeownership to rise by .0009 percent.”65
Depending on the variable for which researchers controlled, increases in
the subsidy rate were also associated with decreases in the
homeownership rate.66 After analyzing the data in various ways,
researchers concluded that “the home mortgage interest deduction is
really not a pro-homeownership policy in any meaningful sense. It
subsidizes housing consumption [meaning that people who would buy
houses anyway might buy slightly larger houses], but its impact on the
homeownership rate appears to be minimal.”67 They noted that our “best
evidence on the irrelevance of the deduction to the homeownership rate
is that over the past 40 years as the deduction’s implicit subsidy has
soared and crashed, homeownership has barely budged.”68 Time studies
find that when the mortgage interest deduction is made more generous,
homeownership rates do not increase. When the mortgage interest
deduction is made stingier, homeownership rates do not decrease. These
studies indicate that the mortgage interest deduction fails to promote
homeownership.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 52.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 41.
Id.
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4. Economic Models
Using the data and studies described above, researchers have
developed new ways to measure and convey the practical impact of the
mortgage interest deduction. Their work points to the extreme costineffectiveness of the mortgage interest deduction as a tool for
increasing homeownership.
The mortgage interest deduction is an extraordinarily expensive
tool for increasing homeownership. Researchers have measured the net
number of taxpayers who probably would not have bought their homes
but for the mortgage interest deduction.69 By dividing the tax
expenditure cost of the mortgage interest deduction by the net number of
households apparently motivated to buy a home because of the mortgage
interest deduction, researchers estimate that “to move a renter household
into homeownership through the [mortgage interest deduction] costs US
taxpayers $53,590 in foregone tax revenue annually.”70 This is the
equivalent of the government making a 20 percent down payment for
each new homeowner on a $267,950 home. Moreover, economists
consider this cost calculation a “lower bound estimate.”71 When state
time-trends are considered, the estimate becomes $75,920 annually per
converted homeowner.72 When other factors are considered, no positive
estimate can be made because the mortgage interest deduction is
associated with a decrease in the overall rate of homeownership
(meaning that if we increase the value and expense of the mortgage
interest deduction, the result will be fewer homeowners).73 The potential
causes for such negative correlations are described in more detail below.
Regardless, these statistics powerfully point to two realities: (1) the
mortgage interest deduction is incredibly expensive, and (2) it does not
meaningfully affect homeownership rates.
Whether we focus on international comparisons, state comparisons,
comparisons over time or economic models, the overwhelming weight
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 19.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. (citing 2010 FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 2) (other internal citations
omitted).

2012]

HOW AND WHY THE MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION FAILED

771

of the evidence indicates that the mortgage interest deduction fails to
increase homeownership rates.
Before moving onto a discussion of what the mortgage interest
deduction does do, it is worth noting that Americans have lost billions of
dollars of potential tax revenue annually because of a policy aimed at
increasing rates of homeownership without demanding proof of the
effectiveness of that policy.74 In the last several years, Americans have
been in extreme need of revenue for expensive economic bailout
programs, post-war efforts, domestic programs and deficit reduction.
Yet, attributes of the mortgage interest deduction insulated it from
public scrutiny. That insulation allowed an incredibly expensive and
ineffective program to continue. The causes of insulation, expense and
ineffectiveness should be identified (as they are in Part II of this article)
and avoided in other tax policies.
B. INFLATES HOME PRICES
The mortgage interest deduction fails to promote homeownership,
in large part, due to price capitalization. Price capitalization is the
increase in the price of an asset due to the increase in the value of an
asset caused by a subsidy or incentive.75 Price capitalization undermines
the effectiveness of the mortgage interest deduction.76 Its effects depend
on whether the supply of housing in a particular area can be increased to

74. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing the amount of revenue
lost due to the mortgage interest deduction); infra note 214 and accompanying text
(describing public support for the mortgage interest deduction).
75. See, e.g., Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 6 (describing “capitalization and
the homeownership rate” and explaining that a tax subsidy increases consumer demand
for housing. As a result, either the supply of housing will increase to meet this increased
demand, or, if supply cannot be expanded, capitalization will occur and the price of
housing will “rise by the full amount of the present discounted value of the tax
subsidy.”).
76. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (testing the proposition that “the capitalization of the
[mortgage interest deduction] into higher house prices offsets the positive effect of the
[mortgage interest deduction] on homeownership attainment” and finding that the data
generally support that proposition).
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meet increased demand or whether the supply of housing in that area is
fixed.77
The amount of price capitalization varies geographically. The
mortgage interest deduction increases the value of, and thus the demand
for, housing. This increased demand will either be met by an increased
supply of housing, which is often available in the suburbs but not in
cities or other areas with restrictive zoning laws or limited available
land,78 or by increased price. In economic theory, and assuming an
efficient market, when demand increases and supply stays fixed, the
price of housing will increase until the extra value provided by the
mortgage interest deduction is fully included in the price of housing (full
capitalization).79 When demand increases and supply increases to meet
it, capitalization either will not occur or will be limited.
For opponents of the mortgage interest deduction, price
capitalization is a double-edged sword. While it further supports efforts
to eliminate the mortgage interest deduction (why support a tax
expenditure that makes housing less affordable?), it also makes
elimination of the incentive more risky (how much will home values
drop as the incentive is phased out? Will the housing market crash as a
result of across-the-board price declines?). Regardless, sound policy can
only result from good information. Thus, it is worthwhile to attempt to
determine the extent to which the value of the mortgage interest
deduction is capitalized into home prices.
77. See, e.g., id. at 5 (summarizing studies indicating that when the supply of
housing is inelastic, the mortgage interest deduction will have “price rather than
quantity effects,” causing the price of housing to increase but not increasing the number
of homeowners).
78. In The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, Roberta Mann argued that because demand for housing
can only be met with increased supply in suburban and rural areas, the mortgage
interest deduction contributes to residential sprawl and the resulting environmental
harms. Mann, supra note 34.
79. Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 6 (the “standard model of housing market
dynamics” predicts that “[i]n the short run, the consumer’s willingness to pay for new
or expanded housing increases according to the present discounted value of the tax
subsidy. The stock of housing is fixed in the very short run, thus the tax policy results in
disequilibria in the housing market, and, depending on the extent to which a supply side
adjustment is expected, the price of housing in the short run may rise by the full amount
of the present discounted value of the tax subsidy.”).
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Many scholars have identified some amount of price capitalization.
They note that tax subsidies for homeownership primarily generate price
effects, increasing the price of housing80 and lament that “such price
capitalization effects may create a perverse outcome whereby the
[mortgage interest deduction] adversely affects the homeownership
attainment of certain groups” by pricing them out of the market.81
Specifically, increases in the mortgage interest deduction “may decrease
the likelihood that down-payment-constrained households will be able to
purchase a house in order to take advantage of the mortgage subsidy.”82
While the goal of the mortgage interest deduction is to increase rates of
homeownership, price capitalization causes the opposite effect by
making housing less affordable.
While scholars generally agree that the mortgage interest deduction
has been capitalized into home prices to some extent, they disagree on
how much home prices have increased due to the mortgage interest
deduction. Economists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and the Wharton School of Business estimate that “repealing the
mortgage interest deduction, with no change to loan-to-value ratios,
would raise the average user cost [of housing] by seven percent.”83
Previously, other researchers estimated that eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction and the property tax deduction simultaneously would

80. Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 6 (citing Dennis R. Capozza, Richard K.
Green & Patric H. Hendershott, Taxes, Mortgage Borrowing, and Residential Land
Prices, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 171-98 (Aaron and
Gale, ed., 2006)); see also Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1179 (“[T]he main effect of the
[mortgage interest deduction] appears to be to raise housing prices and increase loan-tovalue ratios.”).
81. Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 2.
82. Id.
83. James Poterba & Todd Sinai, Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing:
Deductions for Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest and the Exclusion of Imputed
Rental Income 6 (Jan. 5, 2008), available at http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~sinai/
papers/Poterba-Sinai-2008-ASSA-final.pdf. As these authors note, however,
homeowners can reduce their otherwise rising costs by paying down their mortgages
more quickly. “Martin Gervais and Manish Pandey (2006) note that changing the tax
treatment of mortgage interest might have little impact on the user cost if households
altered their loan-to-value ratios [by paying down their mortgages] in response.” Id. at
6.
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reduce house prices by 2 percent to 13 percent depending on the area.84
Price reductions are likely to be greater in areas with high home values
and high loan-to-value ratios (where the mortgage interest deduction is
most valuable) and lower in areas with low home values and low loanto-value ratios.85 Further, because price capitalization generally is more
pronounced in areas with a fixed housing supply,86 price reductions are
likely to be greater in cities and restrictively zoned areas.
C. INCREASES BORROWING AGAINST EQUITY
The mortgage interest deduction may have an odd structure because
it was never affirmatively designed as a tax incentive, but was instead
retained when the deduction for other forms of personal interest were
phased out. The goal of the mortgage interest deduction is to increase
rates of homeownership.87 Yet, homeowners who own their homes
outright receive no benefit from the mortgage interest deduction.
Similarly, homeowners whose mortgages are small receive little to no
benefit. The mortgage interest deduction does not provide a direct
incentive for the purchase or even continued ownership of a home.
Rather, it provides a benefit for homeowners who have borrowed
significantly in order to purchase their homes. It incentivizes highly
leveraged purchases. By incentivizing borrowing, rather than purchasing
84. Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 5 (citing Capozza et al., supra note 80, at
171-98).
85. See Hilber & Turner, supra note 10, at 5 (the mortgage interest deduction is
greater for “higher income homeowners and homeowners residing in regions with high
incomes and high house prices”); id. at 6 (however a more generous mortgage interest
deduction may cause the price of housing to “rise by the full amount of the present
discounted value of the tax subsidy.”).
86. Id. at 17 (the generosity of the mortgage interest deduction, the “mortgage rate
subsidy,” “has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of owning if a
household lives in a metro area with an average degree of regulatory restrictiveness. If a
household lives in a place with relaxed land use controls the [mortgage rate subsidy]
will have a positive impact on homeownership attainment, whereas the effect is
negative in more tightly constrained locations, in line with our theoretical
conjectures.”); id. at 2 (“In places with tight land use regulation (inelastic supply) . . .
the tax subsidies will tend to be capitalized into house prices, and the housing stock will
not expand to facilitate higher homeownership rates.”).
87. See supra note 10.
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or owning a home, the mortgage interest deduction fails to benefit or
incentivize many homeowners, and instead encourages excessive
borrowing. These risky incentives have been described in detail in
previous scholarship,88 but are summarized here with an explanation of
how they undermine the purpose of the mortgage interest deduction and
contribute to an unstable real estate economy.
The incentive to borrow is a risky incentive for American
homeowners. Americans generally have less equity in their homes than
do homeowners in other developed countries. They generally make
smaller down payments, pay down mortgages less quickly and borrow
against their homes more extensively using tools like home equity lines
of credit.89 As a result, Americans often have mortgage balances that
approach, equal or exceed the fair market value of their homes.
Unfortunately, the mortgage interest deduction encourages taxpayers to
have high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Greater tax benefits can be
received if a taxpayer takes out a larger mortgage, pays the mortgage
down more slowly or even finances consumer spending through use of
home equity lines of credit.90 High LTV ratios are associated with higher
rates of mortgage default, foreclosure and economic instability.91 Thus,
in some cases, the mortgage interest deduction incentivizes a behavior

88. See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A
Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing,
69 TULANE L. REV. 373 (1994); Allen Holzer, Restructuring the Tax Treatment for
Home Equity Draws: Implementing Consumption Tax Fundamentals to Preserve Home
Equity, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 225 (2010).
89. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT – THE
MORTGAGE CRISIS 26 (2010), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/2010-0407-PSR_-_The_Mortgage_Crisis.pdf [hereinafter FCIC MORTGAGE
CRISIS REPORT] (“[F]rom 2003 to 2006, median combined LTV, which is the ratio of
total debt outstanding on the house and the value of the home (times 100), rose from 90
to 100 for subprime mortgages and from 90 to 95 for alt-A mortgages. A borrower with
combined LTV of 100 has no equity in his house . . . . Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund
(2009) conclude that increases in combined LTV and in low or no documentation loans
were substantial contributors to the poor performance of loans during the mortgage
crisis.”).
90. See, e.g., Patterson Forrester, supra note 88, at 3-4 (explaining how tax benefits
encourage excessive borrowing against home equity).
91. Id. at 381 n.37; FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 23.
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(i.e. excessive borrowing against one’s home) that can lead to
foreclosure and can undermine a stable and high rate of homeownership.
The incentive for excessive borrowing created by the mortgage
interest deduction is also problematic because it undermines economic
stability. Indeed, the high LTV ratios held by many American
homeowners contributed to the recent economic crisis. Homeowners
with high LTV ratios lose their homes to foreclosure more frequently
than homeowners with low LTV ratios.92 When a homeowner with a low
LTV ratio becomes unable to pay his mortgage, he may sell his home
and cash out his equity interest. In contrast, homeowners with high LTV
ratios often cannot satisfy their mortgages through potential sale
proceeds and are forced to default. Accordingly, “[a] standard model of
mortgage default is known as the double-trigger model.”93 The doubletrigger model observes that “borrowers typically default on a mortgage
only if they have both negative equity —- i.e., they owe more on the
house than it is worth —- and they experience some sort of income
shock, such as job loss, that makes it difficult to continue making
payments on the mortgages.”94 The high LTV ratios, which were
encouraged by the deductibility of mortgage interest, thus contributed to
the recent foreclosure crisis.95
Unfortunately, in addition to incentivizing high LTV ratios, the
mortgage interest deduction further contributed to the housing bubble by
artificially inflating housing prices through price capitalization.
Artificially inflated housing prices have been identified as “a second
major contributor to the increase in defaults during the mortgage
crisis.”96 Even homeowners with significant equity in their homes did
not have enough equity to cushion the extreme crash in prices that
followed the bubble. “[S]tates with particularly large rises and falls in
housing prices —- namely California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada —experienced default rates of roughly twice the national average.”97
Extreme drops in housing prices caused many homeowners to
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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experience negative equity.98 Homeowners with negative equity who
were unable to pay their mortgages had high rates of default. Because
the mortgage interest deduction both contributed to price inflation
during a housing bubble and encouraged high LTV ratios, it likely
increased the number of mortgage defaults and worsened the economic
crisis.
Studies indicate that the mortgage interest deduction not only
theoretically incentivizes borrowing, but is in fact associated with high
LTV ratios. Indeed, the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction
likely would lead to a reduction in LTV ratios. For example, a 1998
U.S.-based study “predicted that removal of the mortgage interest
deduction would lower mortgage debt by 41 percent.”99 When the U.K.
phased out its mortgage interest deduction, its initial LTV ratios
decreased by approximately 25 to 30 percent.100 Since the U.K.
mortgage interest deduction was less generous than the U.S. mortgage
interest deduction, it is reasonable to anticipate that the U.S. would
experience a greater reduction in its LTV ratios by eliminating the
deduction. The reduction in LTV ratios occurs because homebuyers are
motivated to make larger down payments, pay off their mortgages more
quickly and avoid the use of home equity lines of credit in the absence
of a mortgage interest deduction.
The reduction in LTV ratios associated with the elimination of the
mortgage interest deduction would have several stabilizing effects on
the economy.101 First, it would protect against high rates of default.
98. FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 25 (“The sharp drop in
housing prices beginning in 2006 left many borrowers with negative equity.”).
99. Patric Hendershott, Gwilyn Pryce & Michael White, Household Leverage and
the Deductibility of Home Mortgage Interest: Evidence from UK House Purchasers 4
(NBER Working Paper 9207, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9207 (citing James
R. Follain & Lisa S. Melamed, The False Messiah of Tax Policy: What Elimination of
the Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a Careful Look at What It Delivers, 9 J.
OF HOUS. RESEARCH 2, 179-99 (1998)).
100. Id. at 19.
101. However, the reduction in LTV ratios will also decrease the tax expenditure
savings incurred due to elimination of the mortgage interest deduction. See id. at 8
(explaining that the reduction in LTV ratios associated with the elimination of the
mortgage interest deduction would also reduce the amount of additional revenue that
the government could collect due to elimination of the mortgage interest deduction.
Estimates of the tax expenditure cost of the mortgage interest deduction are based on

778

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

Second, it would offset the real estate price reductions that would
otherwise be associated with phasing out the mortgage interest
deduction.102 As homeowners move to lower LTV ratios, they value the
deductibility of interest less.
II. WHY THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FAILED
Having determined in Part I that the mortgage interest deduction
failed to promote homeownership and instead inflated housing prices
and encouraged excessive borrowing, Part II identifies the flaws in the
mortgage interest deduction that caused it to fail.
A. INSENSITIVE TO MARKET CONDITIONS
The first significant flaw of the mortgage interest deduction is its
insensitivity to market conditions. The mortgage interest deduction is
intended to be an incentive for a taxpayer to buy a home. Because it
increases the value of (and thus the demand for) homes at all times, the
mortgage interest deduction increases the price of homes. There are
many economies, including the real estate economy of 2006, in which
increasing the price of homes and further incentivizing consumption of
real estate is bad public and economic policy.103 Unfortunately, the
availability of the mortgage interest deduction does not depend on
whether the taxpayer purchases a home at a time when doing so will
stimulate a weak real estate economy or at a time when doing so will
the value of the deduction currently claimed by taxpayers. If taxpayers changed their
behavior, including by decreasing their LTV ratios, they would reduce the amount of
deduction they might otherwise claim and reduce the tax expenditure cost of the
mortgage interest deduction). Even though reducing LTV ratios would reduce the
additional revenue that the government could collect by eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction, lower LTV ratios would add to the stability of our real estate
economy and should be encouraged.
102. See id. at 20 (“Changes in household leverage would significantly offset the
negative impact of the removal of interest deductibility on house prices, housing
consumption, and homeownership.”).
103. See, e.g., FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 27 (places with
particularly large increases in housing prices tended to experience more significant
price declines and default rates).
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only further drive up unsustainably inflated home prices. The incentive
is available at all times, even when it affirmatively undermines
economic stability.
Unfortunately, the mortgage interest deduction not only provides
some level of subsidy in economies that are damaged by it, it provides
the same level of subsidy in those economies as it provides in economies
that are helped by it. Like its availability, the value of the mortgage
interest deduction is insensitive to market conditions. From the
perspective of a taxpayer, the value of the mortgage interest deduction is
a function of the amount of mortgage interest paid by that taxpayer
(reflecting mortgage terms, interest rate and outstanding mortgage
balance), the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate, the taxpayer’s other
itemized deductions and the amount of the standard deduction. From the
perspective of the United States Treasury, the tax expenditure cost of the
mortgage interest deduction is a function of the number of taxpayers
claiming it, each claimant’s marginal tax rate and the amount of
mortgage interest paid by each claimant.104 Neither the taxpayer’s
benefit from the mortgage interest deduction nor the government’s cost
is affected by economic conditions.105 The incentive does not increase in
value to motivate home purchases during weak economies, or decrease
in value to deflate market bubbles.
The insensitivity to market conditions of the mortgage interest
deduction’s availability and value is a critical failure. There are times
when buyers in the housing market do not need to be and should not be
further incentivized to consume housing. For example, many buyers in
the market for a home in early 2006 participated in a flurry of bidding
activity, sending in above-price offers on sight-unseen homes shortly
after they were listed for sale. The market was hot, and buyers needed
no incentive to participate other than excessive demand and extreme
104. See, e.g., GAO-09-769, supra note 2, at 6 (showing how the total amount of
mortgage interest deduction taken by United States taxpayers depends on the number of
taxpayers claiming the deduction and the amount of deduction claimed by each, which
is a function of the price of homes, the amount of loans on homes, mortgage rates and
marginal tax rates).
105. Interest rates to some extent reflect economic conditions, however, the interest
rate that affects the value of the mortgage interest deduction is not the current interest
rate but the rate reflected in the taxpayer’s mortgage. Such rates can be up to thirty
years old.
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competition.106 In retrospect, that activity was threatening to the
economy and counter-productive. It drove house prices up to
unsustainable levels.107 Even if we are unable to identify these real estate
bubbles as they are occurring, we should be able to identify them as
markets in which tax incentives are unnecessary to maintain high levels
of homeownership or housing prices. Unfortunately, the mortgage
interest deduction continues its subsidy of home purchases during these
times. At best, it is unnecessary and therefore wasteful in bubble
economies. At worst, it is an economically damaging expenditure. Yet
the structure of the mortgage interest deduction makes the incentive
available and equally valuable under all economic conditions.
It would make good economic sense instead to reserve tax
incentives for use in times of actual crisis in the housing market,
identified by attributes including high foreclosure rates and large
numbers of bank-owned properties. By using tax incentives only in
periods of weak or crisis economies, the potential for price capitalization
is significantly reduced, tax expenditure costs are slashed and housing
bubbles are not further inflated.
B. RESISTS CHANGE
A second significant flaw of the mortgage interest deduction is its
resistance to change. From 2000 to 2006, it was clear that housing prices
were increasing at historically unprecedented rates and that homeowners
were more highly leveraged in their homes than they had been
previously.108 It would have made good economic sense, even if tax
incentives for homeownership were not already tied to economic
indicators, for politicians to have the option to decrease these incentives
at that time. Unfortunately, the structure of the mortgage interest
deduction made its modification very difficult. First, the mortgage
106. See FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 13 (“[T]he dramatic
increase in real housing prices beginning in the late 1990s and subsequent fall from
2006 is striking and unprecedented. The size of the increase from 1998 to the peak in
2006 is substantially greater than any previous increase.”).
107. See id. at 17 (explaining that the housing bubble was unsustainable and when
expectations about the future changed, housing prices declined rapidly).
108. See infra notes 129-30 (regarding price increases); infra notes 133-34
(regarding excessive borrowing).
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interest deduction is not enjoyed at the time of purchase.109 A tax
incentive that is provided in full at the time of purchase can easily be
increased or decreased to reflect market conditions or even to reflect
available government resources. A tax incentive provided gradually over
time is more difficult to change. Since most American mortgages are
thirty-year mortgages,110 the mortgage interest deduction is paid out over
decades. Politicians wishing to change the level of incentive for
homeownership would have to upset the expectations of taxpayers who
already own their homes. Even if they were willing to upset longstanding expectations, they would be limited in their ability to affect
market conditions or homeowner behavior. A taxpayer who was initially
incentivized to buy her home based on the promise of the mortgage
interest deduction is unlikely to sell her home once the mortgage interest
deduction is reduced or eliminated. Once people make purchases, loss
aversion decreases the probability that they will then sell the asset even
if it experiences depreciation. Thus, even politicians savvy to market
conditions could not increase or reduce the mortgage interest deduction
in ways that would effectively slow a bubble economy or stimulate a
bust economy.
The mortgage interest deduction is inferior to first-time homebuyer
tax credits because of its resistance to change. A first-time homebuyer
tax credit can offer almost instant stimulus to a bust economy and can be
eliminated in strong economic times. Further, if a first-time homebuyer
tax credit is determined to insufficiently advance its goals, it can be
easily modified. For example, in response to increasing loan-to-value
ratios, a first-time homebuyer tax credit can easily be amended so that
only purchasers with sufficiently large down payments qualify for it. In
contrast, Congress had no effective way to amend the mortgage interest
deduction so that underwater or delinquent homeowners failed to
qualify. Since these homeowners had already purchased their homes,
even a denial of the mortgage interest deduction triggered by their
109.
110.

See infra Part II(C)(2).
See, e.g., FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 10 (detailing the
increase of interest only, optional adjustable rate mortgages and balloon mortgages
relative to traditional, 30-year fixed rate mortgages between 2004 and 2007, but
showing that 30-year fixed rate mortgages remained most common throughout that
period).
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delinquent status would have occurred too late to change their behavior.
Similarly, if the government determined that the mortgage interest
deduction caused social problems (such as excessive sprawl111 or racial
segregation,112 as has been suggested by some critics), it would not have
effective ways to alter the deduction to combat those problems. In
contrast, a first-time homebuyer tax credit could easily be structured so
that only purchasers of high-density housing or only purchasers in
racially diverse neighborhoods would qualify. It could be structured so
that only people purchasing “green” homes, homes in areas that had
suffered rapid depreciation in prices, homes near interstates or mass
transit lines or homes in cities with high levels of residential vacancies
qualified. The first-time homebuyer tax credit can effectively be
changed to influence future behavior. To the extent that the mortgage
interest deduction influences behavior, it does so well in advance of
when it is paid out. Once a purchase decision is made, the mortgage
interest deduction has no way to influence behavior, despite continuing
to provide significant economic benefits to the homeowner. It functions
as an entitlement rather than an incentive of socially- or economicallydesirable behavior.
The economic crisis of 2008 provided a basis for reducing or
eliminating the mortgage interest deduction. Yet it also pointed to the
mortgage interest deduction’s resistance to change. It is a tax incentive
that pays homeowners for decades without having an effective ongoing
ability to influence their behavior. Since homeowners are promised
decades worth of financial benefit, the structure of the deduction
requires that the expectations of homeowners be upset in order to affect
simple changes in policy. The mortgage interest deduction invites
reliance, commits huge government resources for long periods of time
and has only a limited effect on behavior. This makes it bad policy and
points to an inflexibility that should be avoided by future tax incentives.

111. See Mann, supra note 34, at 1350 (arguing that the mortgage interest deduction
increases urban sprawl and the associated environmental harms of sprawl).
112. See Dorothy Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329
(2009) (arguing that the mortgage interest deduction increases geographic racial
segregation).
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C. FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR HUMAN BIAS
The National Association of Realtors ran an ad during the
economic crisis that depicts a young couple at their housewarming
party.113 Motioning over a table filled with multiples of the same present
from various guests, the wife says “we really appreciate all the dip trays
. . . we love dip.” Then, she opens a present offered by Uncle Sam. It is
an envelope filled with $8000 cash, representing the First-Time Home
Buyer Tax Credit that the couple will receive on their next tax return.
The couple is overwhelmed by the gift.
If the ad had instead depicted Uncle Sam delivering the financial
benefits of the mortgage interest deduction, it would be much less
compelling. Uncle Sam would deliver an empty envelope to the 46% of
American homeowners who receive no benefit from the mortgage
interest deduction. To the 54% of American homeowners who do
receive some benefit from the mortgage interest deduction, Uncle Sam
would not deliver cash, but instead an IOU, payable over the next few
decades, declining over time, probably not payable for the couple’s first
year of ownership and revocable if the couple paid off their mortgage
too quickly.114 Unless Uncle Sam was a tax expert with access to an
amortization schedule, a calculator and the amount of the couple’s
charitable contributions and other itemized deductions, the amount
payable on the IOU would be unidentified - neither he nor the couple
would know how much benefit they would receive over time due to the
mortgage interest deduction. Even if the amount of future savings could
be known, future savings would have to be discounted to their present
values. In short, the gift would look hypothetical, conditional and odd. It
might seem surprising to the couple and to Uncle Sam if the gift turned
out to be extremely expensive. The National Association of Realtors
does not run such an ad. Doing so would expose the problems of the
mortgage interest deduction: its value to a taxpayer is unpredictable and
113. RealtorActionCenter, Housewarming, YOUTUBE (July 30, 2009), http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=wDblN0PSPA8.
114. The mortgage interest deduction is often not available for the first year of
homeownership because less than a full year’s worth of mortgage interest is paid. For
example, for a November 1 home purchase, only two months’ worth of mortgage
interest is paid, which makes it unlikely that the potential mortgage interest deduction
will exceed the standard deduction.
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often zero, it is poorly timed, it fails to incentivize behavior and for
those it helps, it becomes an expensive entitlement.
The mortgage interest deduction is intended to encourage taxpayers
to become homeowners.115 Unfortunately, because the incentive does
not account for, or take advantage of natural human biases, it fails to
effectively influence our behavior.
1. Difficult to Predict Value
Because it is difficult to calculate the value of the mortgage interest
deduction116 its effectiveness as an incentive is undermined. First, the
value of the mortgage interest deduction depends on the amount of
mortgage interest paid by a taxpayer in a given year, which in turn
depends on the terms of the mortgage. Even for homeowners with
simple, thirty-year-fixed-rate mortgages, the amount of interest paid on
the loan in any particular year must be determined by calculating the
diminishing amount of interest paid on the loan as part of each monthly
payment and then adding the monthly totals to achieve a yearly total.
For the first month’s payment, the amount of interest paid equals the
principal amount of the mortgage multiplied by the annual interest rate
divided by 12 months. However, for all subsequent monthly payments,
the amount of interest paid equals the remaining loan balance (i.e., the
initial principal amount reduced by all prior principal payments)
multiplied by the annual interest rate divided by 12 months. The loan
balance, the amount of principal paid and the amount of interest paid
change each month as the mortgage is paid down. Only after the amount
of interest paid each month is calculated and those monthly amounts are
compiled into a yearly total is the amount of mortgage interest paid in a
given year known.
The calculation of interest paid in a given year is even more
difficult for negative amortization mortgages and adjustable rate
115.
116.

See supra note 10.
See GAO-09-769, supra note 2, at 10-11 (“The complexity of the laws that
govern the mortgage interest deduction are evident in the guidance IRS has published. .
. . [T]he flowchart in IRS’s 16-page instructions to taxpayers – Publication 936: Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction . . . leads taxpayers through as many as seven decision
points and still sometimes requires them to consult another part of the publication.”).
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mortgages. For negative amortization mortgages (loans in which interest
exceeds payments so that the outstanding balance increases over time),
interest payments will increase over time. For adjustable rate mortgages,
the amount of interest paid in any given year will depend on the interest
rate in effect at that time as well as amounts previously paid and still
outstanding.
Once the amount of mortgage interest paid in a given year is
calculated, the value of the mortgage interest deduction can be
determined through application of tax calculations. For home purchasers
who previously used the standard deduction, the value of a mortgage
interest deduction must be offset by the forgone value of the previouslyclaimed standard deduction and increased to reflect the taxpayer’s
newly-available itemized deductions. Thus, it will often be the case that
the value of the mortgage deduction equals:
 ((Mortgage interest paid in a year plus the amount of all
other itemized deductions, accounting for the 2 percent
haircut117 on miscellaneous itemized deductions118) minus
the standard deduction) multiplied by the taxpayer’s
marginal rate.119

117. Miscellaneous itemized deductions are only allowed to the extent that such
deductions (in the aggregate) exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s AGI. Thus, if a
taxpayer has $100,000 AGI, she may only claim miscellaneous deductions to the extent
they exceed $2000. If she has $2500 total miscellaneous itemized deductions only $500
are in fact deductible given application of the 2 percent haircut.
118. Miscellaneous itemized deductions are all itemized deductions other than the
twelve deductions listed in § 67(b) (the twelve items listed are regular itemized
deductions, not subject to the 2 percent haircut). The twelve regular itemized
deductions are: 1) interest deductible under § 163 (including mortgage interest), 2)
taxes deductible under § 164, 3) casualty or theft losses deductible under § 165, 4)
charitable contributions deductible under § 170 and 642(c), 5) medical expenses
deductible under § 213, 6) impairment-related work expenses, 7) deductible estate tax
paid on income in respect of the decedent under § 691(c), 8) deductible personal
property used in short sale, 9) deduction available when taxpayer restores a substantial
amount held under claim of right, 10) deduction for annuity payments ceased before
investment recovered, 11) deduction for amortizable bond premiums, 12) deduction for
cooperative housing corporations.
119. The calculation is more complicated for taxpayers with high adjusted gross
incomes due to the overall limitation on itemized deductions in 26 U.S.C. § 68.
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Since the taxpayer’s marginal rate depends on her taxable income
(income remaining after all deductions are taken), the mortgage interest
deduction can cause a taxpayer to move into a lower rate bracket.
Assuming that a taxpayer navigates these complicated calculations
accurately, any tax benefit she receives will also depend on the timing of
her home purchase. Even a taxpayer with a very high interest rate and
jumbo loan likely will not receive any year-of-purchase benefit from the
mortgage interest deduction if she purchases her home in November,
since she will pay less than two months’ worth of interest in the year of
purchase and likely will not have enough itemized deductions to exceed
the standard deduction. Such a taxpayer will run complicated
calculations only to be disappointed by the answer that her benefit is at
least another year off.
Further, the value of the mortgage interest deduction is complicated
by timing. Since the mortgage interest deduction is paid out over a
period of many years, future benefits must be discounted to their present
values to determine the time-of-purchase value of the mortgage interest
deduction. The anticipated value of the mortgage interest deduction will
prove inaccurate if tax brackets or rates change (which they often do), if
the amount of the standard deduction changes (which it periodically
does because of indexing) or if the taxpayer’s income increases or
decreases enough to change her marginal rate. For a taxpayer taking on
a thirty-year mortgage, the practical answer is that the present value of
the mortgage interest deduction that will be available over the life of the
mortgage cannot be calculated.
Even if a taxpayer could estimate the present value of the mortgage
interest deduction that will be available over the life of the mortgage,
that taxpayer’s estimates would prove incorrect if the taxpayer became
liable for the Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”). While it allows a
deduction for acquisition indebtedness, the AMT does not allow a
deduction for home equity indebtedness.120 Further, the AMT does not
allow deductions for property taxes paid or various other itemized
deductions.121 Thus, a taxpayer who managed to correctly calculate the
value of his mortgage interest deduction under the standard income tax
could have his expectations upended by the AMT. Since taxpayers who
120.
121.

26 U.S.C. § 56 (b)(1)(C)(i), (e) (2006).
Id. § 56 (b)(1)(A)(ii).
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receive mortgage interest deductions tend to be high earners, they are
the group of taxpayers most likely to be liable for the AMT.
In sum, home purchasers simply cannot calculate the value of the
mortgage interest deduction at the time of their purchases with a high
degree of precision or certainty. This fact betrays a significant weakness
of the mortgage interest deduction and a potential explanation for its
ineffectiveness. People are far more likely to engage in action when the
incentives are clearly known. We are careful to nail down a clear
compensation package before accepting a job. We do not take on risk in
an investment unless we are compensated with an appropriate risk
premium. We like to know exactly what benefits are coming. That home
purchasers have only a vague sense of the amount of benefit they will
receive from the mortgage interest deduction likely explains why few
homeowners buy because of that incentive.122
2. Delays Receipt of Value
As detailed above, the value of the mortgage interest deduction
depends on the amount of mortgage interest paid in any given year.
Because few people buy their homes on January 1, the amount of
mortgage interest paid in the first year of ownership is often lower than
the amount paid in second and third years. Indeed, many new buyers
will receive no benefit from the first year of homeownership as a result
of purchasing late in the year. Even after a homeowner starts receiving
benefit from the mortgage interest deduction, that benefit is not paid all
in one year. On the contrary, the benefit is provided very gradually over
time, theoretically up to the thirty-year term of most mortgages in the
United States, unless the amount of mortgage interest paid by the
taxpayer decreases to the point that the taxpayer’s total potential
itemized deductions are less than the standard deduction. This fact
points to a second defect in the structure of the mortgage interest
deduction and a possible explanation for its ineffectiveness. Humans
122. Programs like the First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit, with its clearly defined
$8000 benefit, are much more likely to influence behavior. Indeed, while past first-time
homebuyer tax credits phased out at higher incomes, it is worth considering whether the
incentive goal of a defined $8000 benefit for all eligible taxpayers outweighs the
progressivity goal of an income phase out.
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strongly prefer immediate payoffs relative to delayed payoffs. A
taxpayer who engages in behavior that the government intends to
incentivize wants an immediate reward. The denial of that reward for the
year of purchase runs directly contrary to our strong preferences. While
we can be expected to tolerate the declining value of the deduction over
time,123 we are unlikely to be motivated by an incentive that provides
little benefit promptly.
3. Encourages Risky Behavior
The economic crisis of 2008 was perhaps an overly difficult lesson
in human bias. “[I]n 2008[,] our nation was forced to choose between
risking the collapse of our financial system and economy, or committing
trillions of taxpayer dollars to rescue major corporations and our
financial markets.”124 Despite huge investments in economic stimulus
programs by the government, almost $11 trillion in wealth vanished in
the crisis,125 and housing prices dropped 30 percent in the few years
following the price peak in 2006.126
This crisis was preceded by a dangerous real estate bubble. From
the end of World War II until the late 1990s, home prices remained
steady or experienced moderate increases coupled with periodic slight
decreases.127 In contrast, the dramatic increase in housing prices
beginning in the late 1990s and ending at the peak in 2006 was “striking

123. The mortgage interest deduction declines over time for the most common form
of mortgage—a fixed interest rate term loan. It can increase over time for adjustable
rate mortgages (ARMs) and for negative amortization loans.
124. Media Advisory, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Releases Report on the
Causes of the Financial Crisis, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 2 (2011), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-news/2011-0127-fcic-releases-report.pdf.
125. FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at xv.
126. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, SELECTED FINANCIAL MARKET & ECONOMIC
DATA 7 (2010) (citing the First American CoreLogicLoanPerformance Home Price
Index).
127. FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 13 (citing data from Robert
Shiller, Online Data Robert Shiller, YALE DEP’T OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econ.yale.
edu/~shiller/data.htm); U.S. Home Prices available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu
/img/resource-graphics/full/fig6.2_prices.jpg.
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and unprecedented.”128 During this period, the rate of housing
appreciation was incredibly high and rapidly accelerating.129 United
States home prices rose 86 percent in the less than 10 years from late
1996 to the peak in early 2006. The housing boom was unsupported by
economic fundamentals.130 Rather than relying on the appreciation to
build wealth, many American households cashed out the equity from
their homes to finance consumption. In the years leading up to the
financial crisis, “trillions of dollars worth of financial decisions were
made across the U.S. economy and around the world on the faulty
expectation that national housing prices would only rise. Twenty years
of economic stability had desensitized every player in the housing
market to the possibility that home prices could fall.”131 Homeowner
reliance on increasing prices resulted in huge increases in borrowing.
From 2001 to 2007, mortgage debt in America almost doubled132 and the
amount of mortgage debt per household rose more than 63 percent from
$91,500 to $149,500, despite stagnant wages.133 Artificially high
housing prices and excessive borrowing, often supported by perceived
increases in home values, created an unstable real estate market.134
When housing prices dropped, many homeowners who had actively
stripped equity from their homes did not have enough equity left to
avoid defaulting on their mortgages.135 Mortgage defaults led to

128. Id. at 13 (citing data from Robert Shiller, Online Data Robert Shiller, YALE
DEP’T OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm).
129. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, SELECTED FINANCIAL MARKET & ECONOMIC
DATA 7 (2010) (citing the First American CoreLogicLoanPerformance Home Price
Index).
130. Robert J. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Home
Ownership 4 (NBER Working Paper No. 13553, 2007).
131. TREASURY AND HUD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 4.
132. FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at xx.
133. Id.
134. FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 23.
135. Even homeowners who experience significant income losses can often avoid
defaulting on their mortgages if they have positive equity in their homes. Such
homeowners can sell their homes for a profit or to break even and avoid defaulting on
their mortgages. For this reason, economists refer to a “double-trigger model of
mortgage default” where the triggers of negative equity and income shock both precede
a default. See, e.g., FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 25.
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foreclosures and a glut of foreclosed homes on the market. The resulting
oversupply of bank-owned homes forced prices even lower.
To be sure, overinvestment in real estate was not the only factor
leading to crisis. However, overinvestment in real estate and “excessive
borrowing” were significant contributing factors.136 As the Federal
Crisis Inquiry Commission found, “[w]hile the vulnerabilities that
created the potential for crisis were years in the making, it was the
collapse of the housing bubble . . . that was the spark that ignited a string
of events, which lead to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008. Trillions
of dollars in risky mortgages had become embedded throughout the
financial system . . . [w]hen the bubble burst, hundreds of billions of
dollars in losses” were realized.137 Economic stability was significantly
undermined by an unsustainable increase in housing prices and a
dramatic rise in household mortgage debt.138
Collectively, we regret not having questioned or slowed the
unprecedented appreciation in real estate values in the years leading up
to the crisis, but doing so would have run directly contrary to our biases.
We tend to be economic optimists who prefer to make decisions that
appeal to our hopes rather than likely outcomes,139 to be overconfident
in our own decisions, to disregard regression toward the mean and
expect extreme performance to continue based on observations of
extreme performance in the recent past,140 to overestimate our own
ability to control external events, to ignore strongly negative

136. Media Advisory, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Releases Report on the
Causes of the Financial Crisis, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 1 (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-news/2011-0127-fcic-releasesreport.pdf.
137. FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at xvi.
138. Id. at xvii.
139. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Bubbles, Human Judgment, and Expert Opinion 10
(Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1303, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=275515Shiller (explaining the role of “high
expectations” in the housing bubble).
140. See, e.g., Shiller, supra note 130, at 17 (noting that “[b]oom psychology
encouraged potential homeowners and encouraged lenders as well. Home buyers were
encouraged by the potential investment returns. Mortgage lenders were encouraged
since the boom reduces the default rate on lower-quality mortgages.” Both homeowners
and mortgage lenders anticipated that extreme rates of appreciation would continue.).
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possibilities if they have a low probability of occurrence and (to the
extent we do question our own optimism or overconfidence) to be
quickly reassured by the fact that we see people around us engaging in
similar behaviors.141
The housing boom was supported by a collective social bias, as
well as our individual biases. Economists have noted that “a significant
factor in this boom was a widespread perception that houses are a great
investment, and the boom psychology that helped spread such
thinking.”142 Some have called this collective social bias a speculative
bubble. As Yale economist Robert Shiller explains “[t]he venerable
notion of a speculative bubble can be described as a feedback
mechanism operating through public observations of price increases and
public expectations of future price increases. The feedback can also be
described as a social epidemic, where certain public conceptions and
ideas lead to emotional speculative interest in the markets and, therefore,
to price increases; these, then, serve to reproduce those public
conceptions and ideas in more people. This process repeats again and
again, driving prices higher and higher, for a while. But the feedback
cannot go on forever, and when prices stop increasing, the public
interest in the investment may drop sharply: the bubble bursts.”143 By
expressing to each other our individual impressions that real estate

141. See, e.g., id. at 8-9 (“[T]he notion of a speculative bubble is inherently
sociological or social-psychological, and does not lend itself to study with the essential
tool bag of economists. In my book Irrational Exuberance (2000, 2005), named after a
famous remark of Alan Greenspan, I developed this popular notion of bubbles. I argued
that various principles of psychology and sociology whose importance to economics
has only recently become visible to most economists through the developing literature
on behavioral economics help us to lend more concreteness to the feedback mechanism
that creates speculative bubbles. These principles of psychology include psychological
framing, representativeness heuristic, social learning, collective consciousness,
attention anomalies, gambling anomalies such as myopic loss aversion, emotional
contagion, and sensation seeking.”); Shiller, supra note 139, at 1 (noting the role of
representativeness heuristic, overconfidence, attentional anomalies, self-esteem,
conformity pressures, salience and justification in market bubbles).
142. Shiller, supra note 130, at 7.
143. Id. at 8.
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appreciation would continue, we reinforced our own biases and the
biases of others.144 We inflated the bubble until it burst.
While some economists, including Professor Shiller, properly
identified the extreme appreciation in home prices from 2000 to early
2006 as an unsustainable bubble at the time it was occurring,145 other
economists and many consumers believed that these increased prices
reflected an overall increase in economic well-being and that prices
would continue to rise.
Unfortunately, the mortgage interest deduction only reinforced our
biases. We were incentivized to take out loans with high loan-to-value
ratios because the more interest we paid, the larger the deduction we
received. Many Americans refinanced in 2006, taking cash out of their
homes, and were rewarded by the government with higher tax breaks.
Many others dangerously and unnecessarily secured consumer debts
against their homes through the use of home equity lines of credit in
order to take advantage of the deduction for home equity indebtedness.
The mortgage interest deduction reinforced, instead of counteracting,
our natural biases and encouraged risky behavior prior to the market
crash.146 Its propensity to encourage risky behavior is another significant
flaw of the mortgage interest deduction.

144. Id. at 9 (“I argued that the feedback that creates bubbles has the primary effect
of amplifying stories that justify the bubble; I called them “new era stories.” The stories
have to have a certain vividness to them if they are to be contagious and to get people
excited about making risky investments. Contagion tends to work through word of
mouth and through the news media. It may take a direct price-to-price form, as price
increases generate further price increases.”).
145. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Laing, The Bubble’s New Home, BARRON’S, June 20,
2005; Paul R. Krugman, That Hissing Sound, N.Y. TIMES OP ED, Aug. 8, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/08/opinion/08krugman.html.
146. See, e.g., Shiller, supra note 130, at 19 (noting that there is “likely to be a limit
on how far public policy should attempt to encourage homeownership . . . . [C]reating
too much attention to housing as investments may encourage speculative thinking, and
therefore, excessive volatility in the market for homes. Encouraging people into risky
investments in housing may have bad outcomes. It is possible that some countries have
overreached themselves in encouraging homeownership.”).
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D. FAILS TO INFLUENCE THE PURCHASE DECISION
The international comparisons, interstate comparisons, time-based
comparisons and economic regressions described above collectively tell
us that the mortgage interest deduction fails to increase rates of
homeownership. This is partially based on price capitalization (the
mortgage interest deduction causes homes to be more valuable and
therefore more expensive) and partially based on the failure of the
mortgage interest deduction to influence the decision to purchase.
1. Fails to Provide Value When It Is Needed Most
The mortgage interest deduction fails to influence the decision to
purchase a home because it fails to provide value at the time of the
purchase, when it is most needed. Many taxpayers who hope to become
homeowners identify the need to save up a down payment as the most
significant barrier to their entry into the real estate market.147 In addition
to making a down payment, homebuyers must also pay significant
closing costs at the time of purchase. Ideally, tax incentives would be
paid just prior to the time of purchase, so that home purchasers could
use their tax savings to make larger down payments or to cover closing
costs. However, the Internal Revenue Service is not well-positioned to
make payments other than in connection with tax returns.148 The next
best alternative would be for homeownership tax incentives to be paid in
full in connection with the tax return immediately following the year of
purchase. If the tax incentive was provided in full in the year following a
purchase, it could be used by taxpayers to replenish their savings (often
depleted in order to make a down payment), to help cover the costs of
moving to the new residence or to provide funds to furnish or improve
147. FANNIE MAE, NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY FIRST QUARTER 50 (May 2011),
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/housingsurvey/pdf/NationalHousing-Survey-q12011.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE MAE 1ST Q 2011 HOUSING SURVEY]
(having enough for a down payment is identified as one of the three biggest obstacles to
homeownership, along with insufficient income and a poor credit history).
148. Providing payments outside of the tax return cycle, monitoring taxpayer
behavior to assure that the planned home purchase was in fact made and addressing
failed transactions likely would impose overly demanding administrative burdens on
the Service.

794

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

the new residence. Additionally, as explained above, it appeals to
taxpayers’ strong preferences for immediate benefits.
The mortgage interest deduction fails as an incentive in part
because it does not provide economic benefit when it is most needed (at
or near the time of purchase), and instead provides economic benefits
when they are least needed (in the decades following a home purchase)
and least likely to affect the decision to buy.
2. Provides Little to No Benefit to Many Buyers
It is a common misconception that everyone who pays mortgage
interest receives the mortgage interest deduction. In truth, in 2005, only
54 percent of America’s homeowners received any benefit from the
mortgage interest deduction.149 Almost half of the total number of
homeowners receive no benefit because their potential mortgage interest
deductions are less than the standard deduction. These homeowners are
overwhelmingly in lower- or middle-income tax brackets. When nonhomeowners are considered, only 23 percent of Americans receive any
benefit from the mortgage interest deduction.150
Even among the homeowners who do receive a financial benefit
from the mortgage interest deduction, the effects of the deduction are
extremely regressive.151 Scholars have referred to it as “an upside down
subsidy”152 since it so strongly helps the rich while providing fewer
benefits (or potentially harms in the form of increased home prices) to
homeowners who are not rich. Homeowners in the lowest 60 percent of
the income distribution obtain only 3 percent of the benefits of the

149. 2005 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 26; CBO PUB. NO. 3191,
supra note 26, at 188.
150. Leonhardt, supra note 25.
151. See, e.g., Poterba & Sinai, supra note 83, at 11 tbl. 1 (showing for homeowners
between the ages of 25-35 who have annual household income in excess of $250,000,
the average tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction is $7077; for homeowners
over the age of 65 who have household income less than $40,000, the average tax
savings from the mortgage interest deduction is only $5; since homeowners over the
age of 65 often have very low loan-to-value ratios, they save an average of only $149
due to the mortgage interest deduction across all income levels).
152. Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1178.
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mortgage interest deduction153 while homeowners in the top 20 percent
of income distribution receive 83.7 percent of its benefits.154 The
difference in the amount of benefit enjoyed by individual high-income
households as compared to individual low-income households is
substantial. Among homeowners who benefit from the mortgage interest
deduction, “tax savings for those at the median top 10 percent of the
income distribution ($4,151) will be about 16.5 times the tax savings for
those at the median of the bottom 20 percent ($252).”155
There are many reasons for the regressive nature of the mortgage
interest deduction. First, higher income taxpayers are more likely to own
their own homes and, potentially, to own second homes. Second, and
more surprisingly, among homeowners, higher income homeowners are
more likely to have mortgages and home equity lines of credit on their
homes, while lower income homeowners are more likely to own their
homes outright.156 Third, higher income households are more likely to
have expensive homes and high mortgage balances.157 Fourth, higher
income households are more likely to itemize their deductions.158
Indeed, few low- and moderate-income families itemize because few
pay enough mortgage interest to exceed the standard deduction. Finally,
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
See id. at 1179.
Anderson et al., supra note 27, at 14.
Annamaria Lusardi, Americans’ Financial Capability, Report Prepared for the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (NBER Working Paper No. 17103, 2010) (noting
that homeowners with less than $25,000 annual income do not tend to have mortgages
or home equity lines of credit—only 31 percent have a mortgage and 11 percent have a
home equity line of credit. Homeowners with $25,000-$75,000 of annual income are
more likely to have such debts—61 percent have a mortgage and 20 percent have a
home equity line of credit. Homeowners with more than $75,000 of annual income are
most likely to have such debts—77 percent have a mortgage and 27 percent have a
home equity line of credit. Since these statistics focus on homeowners only, they
establish that many low-income homeowners own their homes outright).
157. Poterba & Sinai, supra note 83, at 3 (“There is a strong positive relationship
between household income and house value. Home value averages $201,700 for
families with incomes of $40-75,000, compared with $427,800 for those with incomes
between $125,000 and $250,000.”).
158. Id. at 2 (“More than 98 percent of homeowners with income in excess of
$125,000 claim itemized deductions, compared with only 23 percent of those with
incomes below $40,000.”).
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higher income households have higher marginal income tax rates.
Collectively, these factors mean that high-income households receive
the overwhelming majority of the benefits provided by the mortgage
interest deduction.
The extremely regressive nature of the mortgage interest deduction
is problematic not only because it undermines the otherwise progressive
nature of the income tax, but because it undermines its potential
effectiveness as an incentive. Lower-income and middle-income
taxpayers likely are not incentivized by the mortgage interest deduction
because they receive little to no benefit from it. Any influence that the
mortgage interest deduction has on their behavior is likely due to a
mistaken belief that it will provide them economic benefit. These
taxpayers will have their expectations upset in the first years of
homeownership.
While the rich receive significant benefits from the mortgage
interest deduction, they are the taxpayers who are most likely to own
homes anyway, even in the absence of a subsidy. As the Joint
Committee on Taxation recently noted, “[t]he distributional impact of
the mortgage interest deduction indicates that the largest tax
expenditures accrue to those households with the highest incomes, who
may have purchased homes even in the absence of the deduction.”159
The mortgage interest deduction’s failure to benefit many buyers
and payment of significant benefits to buyers who likely would have
purchased homes anyway undermines its effectiveness at promoting
homeownership.
3. Incentivizes Already Incentivized Buyers
The mortgage interest deduction likely also fails to promote
homeownership because it offers financial incentives to people who are
acting primarily for non-financial reasons. A national housing survey
conducted by Fannie Mae in 2011 found that people from all income
levels who purchase homes are motivated primarily by non-financial
reasons. “Only 1 in 3 Americans believe that financial benefits of
homeownership are superior to the lifestyle benefits . . . [and] every
single sub-audience perceives lifestyle benefits (stable home for
159.

JCX-40-11, supra note 10, at 4.
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children, freedom to make improvements and sense of community) as
superior to financial benefits.”160
America’s long history of providing tax benefits to homeowners
has not changed these priorities. While Americans report that they value
the tax benefits of homeownership somewhat, those benefits are rated as
significantly less valuable than other benefits of homeownership. For
example, the Fannie Mae survey found that while 48 percent of
Americans surveyed marked tax benefits as a major reason to buy a
home, significantly more (70 percent) marked “control over what you do
with your living space, like renovations and updates” as a major
reason.161 Of the 15 potential reasons to buy a home that were polled, tax
benefits ranked fourth from last, beating only the reasons that
homeownership “gives me something I can borrow against if I need it,”
is “a symbol of your success or achievement” and “motivates you to
become a better citizen and engage in important civic activities . . . .”162
Only 14 percent of respondents reported that tax benefits caused them to
purchase their first homes.163
Interestingly, among homeowners, tax benefits were rated as most
valuable by homeowners who were delinquent or underwater on their
160.
161.
162.
163.

FANNIE MAE 1ST Q 2011 HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 147, at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id.
See FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE 2010 NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 93 (Apr.
2010), http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/2010/National-Housing-Survey-040610
.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE MAE 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY]. When asked “What led you to
purchase your first home” only 14 percent of respondents selected “to gain tax benefits”
and a disproportionately high number of those who made this selection were delinquent
on their mortgages (among delinquent borrowers, 25 percent selected tax benefits as the
reason they purchased their first homes). Luckily, the focus on non-financial interests
has also led homeowners to pay off their mortgages more quickly than they otherwise
might have if they were more influenced by the tax deductibility of mortgage interest.
See FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE 1998 NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 8 (1998),
http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey/survey1998.pdf (52 percent of
respondents said “I am interested in paying off a mortgage as quickly as possible in
order to build equity in my home and minimize the amount I pay in interest on my
debt” compared to only 37 percent who said “I prefer to take advantage of the low
interest rate and tax deductions on a mortgage to use the equity I have paid into my
home to finance other investments, such as stocks or bonds, education expenses or other
things, and I will pay my mortgage off more slowly.”).
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mortgages.164 Similarly, and perhaps because many renters likely
assume that everyone with a mortgage benefits from the mortgage
interest deduction, while many homeowners have had a rude awakening
to the contrary, renters are more likely to see tax benefits as a major
reason to buy a home than are homeowners.165
Offering financial incentives to buyers who are motivated primarily
by non-financial considerations is a wasteful use of resources and
undermines the effectiveness of the mortgage interest deduction.
4. Value of Incentive Is Capitalized into Price
As is described above, the mortgage interest deduction likely fails
to increase rates of homeownership because much of its value is
capitalized into the price of homes. Since the deduction makes homes
more valuable, it makes them more expensive and prevents potential
purchasers from being able to afford homes.
Not every tax incentive will be capitalized into the price of an asset.
Price capitalization occurs in response to the mortgage interest
deduction because the supply of housing is at least partially restricted by
the limited nature of buildable land and by zoning laws. Because
increased demand cannot be met with increased supply, the incentive
drives up costs and proves ineffective. Further, because the mortgage
interest deduction is a permanent, or at least indefinite, subsidy for
homeownership, the real estate market has time to respond to that
incentive by capitalizing it into real estate prices. The market would
164.
165.

FANNIE MAE 1ST Q 2011 HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 147, at 55.
FANNIE MAE, FACT SHEET: FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY KEY
FINDINGS FIRST QUARTER 2011 56 (2011), http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/2011/
Housing-Survey-Fact-Sheet-q12011.pdf (48 percent of renters cite tax benefits as a
major reason to buy a home while only 42 percent of homeowners do); see also FANNIE
MAE 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 163, at 89 (noting that when renters were asked
“If you were going to purchase a home, which of the following would play a role in that
decision,” 20 percent identified tax benefits); FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE 1996
NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 8 (1996), http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/
survey/survey1996.pdf (67 percent of low- to moderate-income renters believe that
“[d]oing away with the mortgage interest deduction would be an obstacle to
homeownership” while only 57 percent of the general adult population surveyed
agreed).
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have less opportunity to respond if the homeownership subsidy was
limited in duration.
The mortgage interest deduction fails to promote homeownership
because it indefinitely subsidizes the purchase of an asset that is in
limited supply. The failure of the mortgage interest deduction should
cause us to be cautious of long-term tax incentives that encourage
increased consumption of limited goods. Their effectiveness will be
undermined by some amount of capitalization.
III. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION SHOULD
BE REPEALED AND REPLACED
For the reasons described above, the mortgage interest deduction
should be repealed in its entirety. It fails to increase rates of
homeownership, inflates the price of housing and discourages the entry
of potential buyers into the market. By further inflating housing prices,
even in times of unsustainable appreciation, it leads to more dangerous
economic bubbles and more devastating economic busts. It is insensitive
to economic conditions and resistant to change. The mortgage interest
deduction should be repealed and replaced with time-limited tax
incentives that are provided only when and to the extent necessary to
stabilize the housing market during periods of crisis.
A. GRADUAL PHASE OUT
The mortgage interest deduction should be repealed in its entirety.
Since its repeal will upend taxpayer reliance and decrease home prices,
the repeal should be gradual. However, full repeal, without the
grandfathering of existing mortgages, is appropriate. The mortgage
interest deduction is an over hundred billion dollar annual tax
expenditure that does not meaningfully advance its goal of promoting
homeownership and instead contributes to instability in the housing
market. It should not be sustained.
In 2005, a bipartisan Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
recommended changes to the mortgage interest deduction that provide a
helpful starting point for plans to phase out the deduction. These
recommendations, with some key modifications, offer an appropriate
plan for its gradual phase out.
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In 2005, the Panel recommended converting the mortgage interest
deduction into a 15 percent tax credit available to all taxpayers
regardless of their marginal tax rates. This tax credit would not function
like a first-time homebuyer tax credit available in the year of purchase.
Rather, like the mortgage interest deduction, it would be payable over
the term of the mortgage and its value would be based on the mortgage
interest paid in any given year. However, instead of multiplying the
amount of mortgage interest paid in any given year by the taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate (currently up to 35 percent), the amount of mortgage
interest paid in any given year would be multiplied by 15 percent. Since
a fixed percent would be multiplied by the amount of mortgage interest
paid, rather than the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, this incentive was
referred to as a mortgage interest credit (rather than a mortgage interest
deduction). The Panel also recommended limiting the credit to interest
only on mortgages on primary residences and gradually reducing the
mortgage cap from $1.1 million to a number reflecting the average
regional price of housing (ranging from about $227,000 to $412,000
depending on the location of the home).166 The proposal was to be
phased in over five years for existing mortgages.167
The Panel’s recommendations are a helpful starting point for plans
to gradually eliminate the mortgage interest deduction partially because
these recommendations were evaluated in 2005 for their potential
impact on the economy. Despite the significant reduction in mortgage
caps proposed by the Panel, studies showed that nationally only about
13 percent of mortgage originations would have been negatively
affected by the new caps. Only 832,925 mortgage originations of 6.29
million mortgage originations total in one study were for amounts above
the proposed caps.168 The small percentage of homeowners potentially
affected by the reduced mortgage caps proposed by the Panel indicates
that mortgage caps could be reduced without destabilizing the real estate
market.
Studies also showed that, despite the small percentage of
homeowners potentially affected by the reduced caps, the proposal
would have increased tax revenues significantly. The Congressional
166.
167.
168.

2005 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 26, at 61.
Id. at 238.
Anderson et al., supra note 27, at 21.
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Budget Office estimated the potential increased revenue available if
such a proposal took effect in 2013.169 It estimated that $12.7 billion
more revenue would be collected in 2013, that $51.6 billion more
revenue would be collected in 2014 and that a whopping $387.6 billion
more revenue would be collected between the years 2013-2019.170 These
revenue increases were available by reducing the mortgage caps to
regional averages over a five-year-phase-down period, by converting the
deduction to a credit worth 15 percent of the mortgage interest paid by
all taxpayers regardless of their marginal tax rates and by limiting the
deduction to primary residences.
While the proposal by the 2005 Panel is a helpful starting point to
plan for a gradual reduction of the mortgage interest deduction, the data
above indicate that several changes would make the phase out more
effective and avoid the continued harm caused by mortgage tax
incentives.
First, during the phase-down period, the mortgage interest
deduction should be capped at a 15 percent rate, not converted to a 15
percent credit for all taxpayers as the Panel had recommended. The
Panel proposed that all homeowners paying mortgage interest should
receive a credit for 15 percent of the interest they pay regardless of their
marginal rates. Since that 15 percent mortgage interest credit would not
have been an itemized deduction, it would have been available to all
taxpayers, even if they took the standard deduction. Further, since the
credit was offered at 15 percent for all taxpayers, it would have
increased the tax incentive for taxpayers in the 10 percent bracket. These
features of the Panel’s proposal likely were efforts to make the mortgage
interest incentive more progressive and to increase the rate of
homeownership. However, since mortgage interest incentives, including
the 15 percent credit proposed by the Panel, are difficult to predict,
poorly-timed, insensitive to market conditions, resistant to change and
cause price capitalization, they should not be increased for any category
of taxpayer, even in the interest of progressivity. Extending the benefits
of mortgage interest incentives to new categories of taxpayers (including
those taking the standard deduction) serves only to increase taxpayer
reliance on a faulty incentive. Instead of offering mortgage interest
169.
170.

CBO PUB. NO. 3191, supra note 26, at 187.
Id.
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incentives to taxpayers who do not currently receive them, targeted firsttime homebuyer tax credits and direct expenditure programs should be
used to increase rates of homeownership by low- and middle-income
taxpayers.
Second, mortgage caps should be gradually reduced to zero—
eliminating the mortgage interest deduction—not simply reduced to
regional averages as the Panel had recommended. While the Panel’s
recommendation of reducing the mortgage cap over five years from the
current cap of $1,100,000 to various caps based on regional averages is
prudent and properly avoids disproportionate disruption to areas with
higher home prices, the cap should be further reduced over the following
five years until the mortgage interest deduction is fully eliminated. The
mortgage interest deduction fails to achieve its goal of promoting
homeownership, results in a huge loss of potential revenue and
exaggerates dangerous boom/bust cycles in the housing market. Tax
incentives for mortgage borrowing should not continue. Instead, they
should be entirely eliminated and replaced with incentives that are fully
paid at the time of a home purchase. Home purchase tax incentives can
more effectively respond to market conditions and are easier to change
if they fail to achieve desired outcomes.
Finally, a plan to phase down and then eliminate the mortgage
interest deduction should coincide with extended homebuyer tax credits
used to stabilize the real estate economy during the transition period for
reasons described in more detail below.
B. REPLACEMENT WITH TARGETED HOMEBUYER TAX CREDITS
Targeted, time-limited homebuyer tax credits are much more costeffective tools for incentivizing home purchases during periods of
economic bust, stabilizing the real estate market and increasing rates of
homeownership. Further, these incentives avoid the price capitalization
that causes the mortgage interest deduction to undermine its goal of
making housing more affordable, they avoid inflation of dangerous
housing bubbles, they are market responsive and they can easily be
modified to improve their effectiveness. The First-Time Homebuyer
Credits used from 2008 to mid-2010, for example, were significantly
more effective policies than the mortgage interest deduction. Similar
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time-limited credits should replace the mortgage interest deduction as
the tax code’s primary incentive for homeownership.
Although not a traditional form of tax incentive, Congress enacted
the First-Time Homebuyer Credit (“FTHBC”) as part of recent
economic stimulus efforts to improve a struggling real estate economy
and to encourage taxpayers to purchase their first homes. Since the
FTHBC was enacted in 2008, it has had three versions. Each version
provided an income tax credit to “first-time homebuyers,” defined as
persons who had not owned homes during the three-year period prior to
the date of purchase and each expired automatically at a set date.171
The first version of the FTHBC, passed as part of the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008,172 provided taxpayers a refundable tax
credit equal to 10 percent of the purchase price of the home up to a
maximum credit of $7500. Taxpayers taking the credit were required to
pay the credit back ratably over 15 years, beginning in 2011.173 The
payback requirement was accelerated if the home was sold or was no
longer used as the taxpayer’s primary residence. The credit phased out
for higher income taxpayers (phase out occurred for single filers with
modified adjusted incomes174 between $75,000 and $95,000, and for
married filing jointly taxpayers with incomes between $150,000 and
$170,000).175
The second version of the FTHBC was passed as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. It retained the
earlier version’s refundable credit for 10 percent of the purchase price
and retained the levels of income phase out, but increased the credit’s
171. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1025R, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
USAGE AND SELECTED ANALYSES OF THE FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDIT 1 n.1 (Sept.
2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-1025R]; 26 U.S.C. § 36(c)(1) (2006).
172. GAO-10-1025R, supra note 171, at 3; Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3011, 122 Stat. 2654, 2658 (2008).
173. GAO-10-1025R, supra note 171, at 3; Housing and Economic Recovery Act §
3011.
174. Modified adjusted gross income is AGI plus certain income not included on the
tax return including some types of foreign income. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-166T, FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER TAX CREDIT: TAXPAYERS’ USE OF THE
CREDIT AND IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 8 (2009) [hereinafter
GAO-10-166T].
175. Id.
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cap to $8000 and provided that for homes purchased in 2009, no
repayment was required unless the home was resold or ceased to be a
primary residence within 3 years of purchase.176
The third version, passed as part of the Worker, Homeownership,
and Business Assistance Act of 2009, extended the timeframe in which
taxpayers could buy a home to qualify for the credit from November 30,
2009 to April 30, 2010, increased income phase outs to $125,000$145,000 for single taxpayers and $225,000-$245,000 for joint
taxpayers177 and provided an additional credit of up to $6500 for longterm homeowners who bought new homes.178 The Homebuyer
Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010 extended the required closing
date deadline from June 30 to September 30 for any eligible homebuyer
who had entered into a binding real estate purchase and sale agreement
before April 30, 2010.179
Each version of the FTHBC was limited in time, meaning that only
taxpayers who purchased homes during a set period of time qualified for
the incentive. Collectively, the FTHBC covered purchases from April 9,
2008 until June 30, 2010,180 a period of significant weakness in the real
estate market. More than 3.3 million taxpayers took advantage of the
FTHBC.181 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the three
FTHBC programs combined will result in about $22 billion of lost
revenue through 2019.182
176. Id. at 3; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115, 316 (2009).
177. GAO-10-1025R, supra note 171, at 6.
178. Id. at 3; Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-92, § 11, 123 Stat. 2984, 2989 (2009).
179. GAO-10-1025R, supra note 171, at 2; Homebuyer Assistance and
Improvement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-198, 124 Stat. 1356, 1356 (2010).
180. GAO-10-1025R, supra note 171, at 6.
181. Id. at 3-4 (reporting that about 1 million claimants claimed $7.3 billion in
interest-free loans through the Housing Act provision, about 2.3 million claimants
claimed the credits offered by the Recovery Act and Assistance Act which did not need
to be repaid and these numbers are “likely to increase because the IRS is still processing
FTHBC returns.”).
182. Id. at 1 n.3 (2010) (citing JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-33-08, ESTIMATED
REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 3221 (2008); JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-64-08, “THE HOUSING AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF
2008” SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JULY
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Targeted, time-limited homebuyer tax credits, like the FTHBCs
used from 2008 until the middle of 2010 have several advantages over
the mortgage interest deduction: they take advantage of human bias by
providing prompt benefits, are more progressive and better target
homebuyers who might not otherwise buy, are cost-effective, are market
responsive, help stabilize the real estate economy, avoid price
capitalization and are easy to change.
Homebuyer tax credits are more effective incentives because they
take advantage of human bias in ways that the mortgage interest
deduction does not. Each version of the FTHBC provided its full benefit
to taxpayers in the year immediately following the year of purchase. In
contrast to the mortgage interest deduction, which often provides little to
no benefit in that year, and then provides remaining benefits gradually
over time, this timing is significantly more effective at influencing the
purchase decision. Additionally, the first version of the FTHBC took
particular advantage of the human bias in favor of prompt benefits and
delayed costs. It provided taxpayers a prompt benefit (a 10 percent
credit up to $7500 for home purchases) and required the taxpayers
claiming the credit to ratably repay it over 15 years beginning in 2011.
One million people183 happily took advantage of a credit that, ignoring
the time-value of money, gave them no net benefit. It was effectively an
interest-free loan from the government. The credit was effective in
incentivizing behavior in part because it appealed to our natural bias in
favor of immediate benefits and delayed costs, and provided a financial
benefit when it was most needed—near the time of purchase.184
23, 2008 (2008); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-19-09, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS
FOR THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.
1, “THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009” (2009); JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, JCX-45-09, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE “WORKER, HOMEOWNERSHIP, AND BUSINESS ASSISTANCE ACT OF
2009” (2009)).
183. GAO-10-1025R, supra note 171, at 3-4 (reporting about 1 million claimants
claimed $7.3 billion in interest-free loans through the Housing Act provision).
184. Some critics argue that the first time homebuyer tax credit incentivizes risky
behavior because, while home purchasers appreciate the benefit they receive on the first
tax return after their purchase, they underestimate the negative impact of repaying the
benefit over the next 15 years. This criticism has some merit. However, it is offset by
the fact that homeowners often have a greater ability to pay taxes in the years following
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Homebuyer tax credits are more progressive and better target
potential homebuyers who might otherwise not purchase homes. An
October 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office found
that for 2008 and 2009, “[t]he FTHBC was disproportionately claimed
by taxpayers in the $25,000 to $100,000 AGI range.”185 While this
group represented 46 percent of taxpayers, it represented 74 percent of
taxpayers benefiting from the FTHBC.186 Likely due to the income
phase out, more than half (59 percent) of those benefiting from the
FTHBC had adjusted gross incomes of $50,000 or less.187 In contrast to
the highly regressive mortgage interest deduction, the FTHBC is a much
more progressive tax incentive and likely facilitates the entry of new
buyers into the housing market.
Homebuyer tax credits are more cost-effective than the mortgage
interest deduction at promoting homeownership. Given that the
mortgage interest deduction costs almost $120 billion annually and is
growing each year, while the FTHBC is expected to cost $22 billion
total through 2019, targeted incentives like the FTHBC can easily be
funded by increases in revenue resulting from the phase-out of the
mortgage interest deduction. According to CBO estimates, per dollar of
revenue lost, tax credits appear to be more effective than the mortgage
interest deduction at promoting homeownership.188
Homebuyer tax credits are more responsive to economic conditions
than the mortgage interest deduction. Homebuyer tax credits avoid many
of the harms caused by the mortgage interest deduction because they are
time-limited interventions in the market. Indeed, when Congress enacted
the FTHBC, lawmakers identified it as a short-term tool to “reduce the
glut of foreclosed homes available in the real estate market.”189 They
recognized that it should not be an indefinite market intervention.
Rather, the credit was allowed only to the extent it helped remedy the

a home purchase than in the year of a home purchase, when they must spend their
available cash on a down payment and closing costs.
185. GAO-10-166T, supra note 174, at 3.
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id.
188. CBO PUB. NO. 3191, supra note 26, at 189.
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extreme economic collapse in the real estate economy in 2008 to mid2010.
Lawmakers acknowledged that long-term or indefinite intervention
in the real estate market was not justified. For example, Senator Baucus
stated, “the short-term nature of this credit is also critical because it
would avoid over-subsidizing the housing industry in the long run.”190
Similarly, Senator Isakson argued, “[w]e cannot regulate ourselves, as a
nation, into a strong economy. But we can incentivize people to get
confidence to the financial markets and restore what is a very shaky
economy.”191 Lawmakers seemed to realize that indefinite market
interventions cause price capitalization and can inflate unsustainable
bubbles. They avoided such economic distortions by making the
FTHBC time-limited.
Homebuyer tax credits help stabilize the real estate economy in
times of crisis. The first-time homebuyer tax credits used from 2008
until mid-2010 proved to be effective market interventions. They helped
stabilize the real estate economy at a time of crisis. “[W]e absorbed a
tremendous amount of the standing inventory [of unsold homes]. Values
came back in the United States and the housing market responded.”192
After months of record low home sales, sales rose markedly when the
first-time homebuyer tax credit was available, as buyers rushed to take
advantage of the incentive before it expired.193 While proponents of the
first-time homebuyer tax credit acknowledge that the policy might not
significantly increase homeownership rates in the long run, the credit
provided short-term economic stimulus during a housing bust.194 In
contrast, the mortgage interest deduction cannot help stabilize crisis
economies, and even contributes to them by artificially inflating home
prices during real estate bubbles.
Homebuyer tax credits better avoid price capitalization. Since
homebuyer tax credits generally only provide incentives to buyers who
have not previously owned homes and since they are time-limited, they
only increase demand in a share of the total market and only for a short
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period of time, within which prices are less likely to respond with full
price capitalization. Additionally, since sellers have an incentive to close
their deals before the credits expire, they have an incentive to keep their
prices low while credit is available.
Homebuyer tax credits are easy to change and properly subject to
periodic review. One important indicator that the FTHBCs used from
2008 to mid-2010 were successful policies is the fact that they expired.
While these credits were twice renewed and expanded during a period of
economic crisis, they ended in June 2010. Lawmakers allowed the
credits to expire despite strong pro-homeownership attitudes, the
financial interests of their constituents and pressures from the housing
industry. The same pressures that have kept the mortgage interest
deduction in place for decades, despite its huge expense and
ineffectiveness, did not keep the homebuyer tax credits in effect. Given
the benefits of short-term interventions and the harms of long-term
interventions in the real estate market, the expiration of the FTHBC is
proof of its policy advantage over the mortgage interest deduction.
Targeted tax incentives like the first-time homebuyer tax credit,
which are payable in full around the time of purchase, should be used
immediately in an effort to stabilize the housing market as the mortgage
interest deduction is phased out and reverse-capitalization decreases
home prices. These targeted tax incentives should also be used in
periods of significant instability in the housing market. They should not
be used to artificially inflate housing prices or to support unstable
housing bubbles. In order to guard against the risk that they will be used
to artificially inflate housing prices, these incentives should be presumed
inappropriate except when the rate of foreclosures is high or when there
is an oversupply of bank-owned properties on the market. Tax
incentives for homeownership should be used to address market crashes,
but should not be used, as the mortgage interest deduction has been, as a
permanent intervention into the market.

2012]

HOW AND WHY THE MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION FAILED

809

C. CRITIQUES
While there are risks associated with eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction, 195 these risks do not justify continuing a deduction
that is ineffective at promoting homeownership and is extremely
expensive.196
195. Those who support continuation of the mortgage interest deduction often argue
that homeownership should be encouraged because homeowners are more invested in
and do more for their communities. They argue that because homeowners have both
personal and financial interests in the community, they work harder than renters to keep
their communities strong and, therefore, home values high. For example, economists
have argued that “the homeowner has a powerful financial incentive to play an active
role in dealing with some social problems that we, as citizens, must address
collectively.” Joseph W. Trefzger, Why Homeownership Deserves Special Tax
Treatment, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 340, 345 (1998). While there is a lively debate about
whether high rates of homeownership improve communities, with proponents saying
that homeowners better maintain their homes and gardens, support their local schools
and participate more in local politics and opponents saying that homeowners prefer
geographic segregation of races and classes, cause urban sprawl and support restrictive
zoning measures that inflate housing prices, this debate is only relevant if the mortgage
interest deduction actually increases the rate of homeownership. Since the evidence
overwhelmingly indicates that the mortgage interest deduction does not increase rates
of homeownership, this article will not address critiques based on the assumption that it
does. See, e.g., Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 52, at 5-6 (discussing correlation of
homeownership with better maintenance of the housing stock, higher levels of local
voting, support for school spending, opposition to social welfare and hospital spending
and “more aggressive” opposition to “racial integration”); Gale et al., supra note 61, at
1177 (arguing that “while there are some compelling arguments in theory for external
benefits from homeownership, there is little evidence in practice to support those
arguments. That does not prove that the arguments are wrong, but the burden should be
on advocates of homeownership subsidies to make the case, and that case has not yet
been made in a compelling fashion.”).
196. On the opposite end of the spectrum from mortgage interest deduction
proponents are tax theorists who argue that even if the mortgage interest deduction is
eliminated, the tax treatment of homeownership still violates horizontal equity and
offends notions of income and wealth. They point out that the most significant tax
incentive provided to homeownership is not a credit or a deduction but an omission.
The tax code does not tax imputed rental income—the benefit enjoyed by a homeowner
for the right to live in her own home. Landlords receive rent from tenants (paid by
tenants with after-tax dollars) but must pay income tax on the rent they receive. In
contrast, homeowners live in their homes without paying income tax on the fair market
value of the rent. Several other countries avoid this inequitable treatment of landlords
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1. Home Prices Will Fall
One risk of eliminating the mortgage interest deduction is the risk
of declining home prices. The deduction should be reduced gradually
over time to slow the reverse-capitalization of housing prices and avoid
a housing bust. Further, the housing market should be monitored
carefully for signs of instability. While some drop in home prices is to
be expected (and likely is a necessary result of eliminating the
incentive), significant increases in mortgage default rates or in the
supply of bank-owned homes remaining on the market for extended
periods of time would indicate that additional housing incentives were
appropriate. However, for the reasons detailed throughout this paper,

(who we anticipate pass on their increased tax costs to their tenants) and homeowners
by taxing the homeowners on the imputed rental value of their homes. See, e.g., Gale et
al., supra note 61, at 1182 tbl. 6 (explaining that Switzerland, Sweden and the
Netherlands are among the countries that tax imputed rent). Solving the problems
created by the mortgage interest deduction by taxing imputed rental income appears to
be an elegant and intellectually satisfying solution. Horizontal equity can be restored
and homeowners can properly continue taking the mortgage interest deduction (indeed
they should be able to deduct the entire mortgage payment—income and principal—as
an ordinary and necessary cost of earning the imputed rental income) while paying a
more fair share of taxes. However, in addition to the valuation problems of this
proposal, it would lead to dramatic increases in the cost of housing at an inopportune
time. “Taxing net imputed rent would lead to substantially higher tax burdens for
homeowners. Average taxes would rise by almost $1900, and age 50+ households
making $250,000 or more would owe $10,000 or more in additional taxes.” Poterba &
Sinai, supra note 83, at 9. The notion of most upsetting the reliance of taxpayers who
have lived in their homes for many years and paid off significant portions of their
mortgages with significant tax increases seems unfair and potentially economically
devastating. More importantly, like the mortgage interest deduction, taxation of
imputed rental income is dangerous economic policy because it is insensitive to market
conditions. Taxation of housing would depend only on the fair market value of rent and
the taxpayer’s marginal rate, leaving insufficient flexibility. While the mortgage interest
deduction stands in the way of properly decreasing incentives during periods of
economic boom, the taxation of imputed rental income would stand in the way of
properly increasing incentives during periods of economic bust. While a detailed
discussion of taxation of imputed rent is beyond the scope of this article, such a
discussion is provided in William Mathias, Curtailing Economic Distortions of the
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43 (Fall 1998).
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housing incentives in the form of time-limited homebuyer tax credits
will more effectively address a housing bust.
Fortunately, homebuyer tax credits are more suited to current
economic conditions. William Wheaton, Economics Professor from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently argued that the primary
threat in our current real estate economy is not the drop in prices but the
increase in foreclosures. The foreclosure crisis, he argued “just keeps
dumping houses on the market. And the problem is that there’s not
enough first-time buyers left in the current situation to absorb those
houses once they get in the market.”197 Luckily, the first-time
homebuyers needed to restore stability in the housing economy will not
be significantly affected by reductions in the mortgage interest
deduction.198 Given that the glut of foreclosed homes is the most
significant threat to the current real estate economy, and that lower- and
middle-income first-time homebuyers are the potential solution, the
mortgage interest deduction can be phased out at the same time as the
current real estate market is stabilized by homebuyer tax credits.
Unfortunately, it is reasonable to anticipate that some price
reduction will occur as the mortgage interest deduction is eliminated.199
However, available information from the U.K. indicates that this risk
may be overstated. Like the U.S., the U.K. initially provided tax
subsidies for personal interest. In 1974, the U.K. eliminated tax
subsidies for most forms of personal interest, but retained a deduction
for mortgage interest on a taxpayer’s principal residence, provided that
the interest was on a loan up to £25,000.200 The limit was raised to
£30,000 in 1983, however, since it was not indexed for inflation, it
stayed fixed and affected an increasing number of homeowners over
time.201 By 1995 to 1998, two-thirds of new mortgage originations were
197. William Wheaton interview with Robert Siegel, NPR, July 20, 2011, available
at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/20/138555793/mit-professor-discusses-mortgage-ded
uction-reform?ft=1&f=2.
198. Id.
199. See Robert J. Aalberts, Will the Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction Ever Be
Eliminated?, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 1, 2 (2011) (“Although few think of the deduction as a
type of subsidy for those who own real estate, that’s precisely what it is. And a subsidy
always increases the price that someone has to pay, including buyers of real estate.”).
200. Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1180; Hendershott et al., supra note 99, at 6.
201. Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1180; Hendershott et al., supra note 99, at 6.
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above the cap.202 Increasing mortgage balances and other factors meant
that the mortgage interest deduction became less valuable to U.K.
taxpayers over time. “Because of inflation, declining interest rates, and
lower subsidy rates, the value of the [mortgage interest deduction in the
U.K.] fell by about 90 percent between 1974 to 1996.”203 In an action
that compounded the already declining value of the deduction, the U.K.
government then decided to phase-out the mortgage interest deduction
entirely. The mortgage interest deduction was initially allowed at the
taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate but “beginning in 1993, the
maximum rate at which interest under that [£30,000] ceiling could be
deducted was reduced in four steps to zero in 1999.”204 Since 1999, the
U.K. has not allowed a deduction for mortgage interest. The elimination
of the mortgage interest deduction did not decrease rates of
homeownership in the U.K.205
Even more encouragingly, real estate prices stayed high in the U.K.
during and after the elimination of the deduction. Like the U.S., the U.K.
202.
203.
204.

Hendershott et al., supra note 99, at 6.
Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1181.
Hendershott et al., supra note 99, at 6 (“[T]he maximum tax rate at which
interest could be deducted was cut from the 40 percent maximum income tax rate to 25
percent in 1992, to 20 percent in 1994, to 10 percent in 1995, and finally to zero in
1999.”).
205. There is no indication that the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction
negatively affected homeownership rates in the U.K. Between the early 1970s and
1996, the value of the mortgage interest deduction fell by about 90 percent, and yet
homeownership rates steadily increased. See Dep’t of Communities and Local Gov’t,
Live Table on Household Characteristics http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing
/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/householdcharacteristics/livetabl
es/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2011) (follow “Table 801: Tenure Trend” hyperlink) (In 1971,
51 percent of UK citizens lived in owner occupied homes. By 1996, that number had
grown to 68.5 percent). From 1993 to 1999, when the U.K. mortgage interest deduction
was formally phased out, U.K. homeownership rates increased from 68.3 to 69.9
percent. See id. This was not simply because the decline in homeownership was
delayed. “Between 1981 and 2004, the British homeownership rate rose 13 percentage
points . . . [while] U.S. homeownership rates rose by less than 4 percentage points over
the same period.” Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1181. Even accounting for the variety of
factors that affect homeownership rates in one country versus another country “the
double-digit increases in the homeownership rate during the same period as huge
reductions in mortgage subsidies is striking evidence against a large effect from the
[mortgage interest deduction].” Id.

2012]

HOW AND WHY THE MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION FAILED

813

experienced dramatic increases in home prices from 1997 to 2006.206
While the U.S. and U.K. both experienced declines from 2006 to
2009,207 U.S. home prices declined more significantly than U.K. home
prices.208 The U.K. eliminated its mortgage interest deduction during a
period of economic growth and the elimination of the incentive did not
prevent that growth.
While it should be anticipated that U.S. home prices could decrease
in response to the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction, such
decreases can be countered through time-limited tax credits and direct
expenditure programs.209 Even if the risk of reverse-capitalization and
depreciation in home prices is high, however, maintaining the mortgage
interest deduction in order to avoid price reductions in housing is
economically unsupportable. Artificially inflated housing prices are
risky, “possibly leading to larger boom and bust cycles.”210 Further, the
mortgage interest deduction becomes a more expensive tax expenditure
each year. Thus, we are not only maintaining levels of inefficient price
capitalization with our current tax policies, we are increasing these
levels each year. While price reductions may be stabilized by a gradual
phase-out of the mortgage interest deduction and the simultaneous use
of homebuyer tax credits, the fear of price reduction should not cause
the continuation of an ineffective incentive.
2. Taxpayer Reliance
Another concern about eliminating the mortgage interest deduction
is the apparent unfairness of taking away a long-standing incentive after
taxpayers have innocently and reasonably relied on its existence. For as
206.
207.
208.
209.

FCIC MORTGAGE CRISIS REPORT, supra note 89, at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17 fig.9 (showing international home prices 1997-2009).
But see 2005 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 26, at 59 (arguing that
because the economy-wide tax rate on housing investment is close to zero, compared
with a tax rate of approximately 22 percent on business investment, and 26 percent on
corporate investment, the “disproportionately favorable treatment under the tax code”
for real estate investment may inefficiently reduce investment in these other sectors).
210. See TREASURY AND HUD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 25
(“Government support makes investment in housing more attractive . . . it can inflate
the value of housing assets, possibly leading to larger boom and bust cycles.”).
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long as the income tax has existed, so has the mortgage interest
deduction. Taxpayers who purchased homes based on the support
provided by the mortgage interest deduction will be harmed by the
change. It may feel unfair to have intentionally incentivized their
behavior only to change the rules. For example, David Lereah, Chief
Economist for the National Association of Realtors, argues that even if
the mortgage interest deduction is a flawed incentive, it should not be
repealed now that taxpayers have relied on it. “If you’re rewriting the
book of Genesis[,]” he says, “I might have a different approach. But if
you make changes in the middle of the game, it’s going to have a
negative impact on the value of property . . . reduce people’s retirement
nest egg, funds they have available for college. You’re going to cause a
great dislocation.”211 Although this is also to some extent a fair criticism,
the criticism needs to be weighed against the benefits of elimination.
The taxpayer reliance critique should not be overstated. A taxpayer
who significantly relies on a certain amount of anticipated mortgage
interest deduction is either a financial expert, tax expert and policy
expert combined, or is relying not on a known value but a vaguely
estimated one. For any taxpayer with a fixed rate mortgage, the value of
the mortgage interest deduction is expected to decline over time as
mortgage payments consist of a smaller share of interest and a larger
share of principal. At some point, the amount of mortgage interest will
decline so significantly that the standard deduction will exceed the
potential mortgage interest deduction and the tax incentive will be lost.
Second, the value of the deduction will change as the taxpayer moves
marginal tax rates (which can occur either because the taxpayer’s
taxable income changes or because the government changes the rate
schedule). Third, for many taxpayers, existing policies already upset
their expectations of value. For example, many first-time homebuyers
likely are surprised when they receive no deduction for the first year of
homeownership due to their late-in-the-year purchases. Similarly,
taxpayers with adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”) not only experience
changes in the interest rates on their mortgage, but experience changes
in the amount of potentially-deductible mortgage interest they pay.
Finally, taxpayers who become liable for the Alternative Minimum Tax
211. Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2006.

2012]

HOW AND WHY THE MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION FAILED

815

are very likely to have their expectations regarding the value of the
mortgage interest deduction upset.212 While upsetting taxpayer reliance
is never ideal, even current policies upset taxpayer reliance in significant
ways. This harm should be minimized—for example, by gradually
phasing out the mortgage interest deduction until its eventual
elimination—but must be worked through.
3. Public and Political Opposition
A final critique of eliminating the mortgage interest deduction is
that the public will not support its elimination.213 There is no doubt that
the mortgage interest deduction is an incredibly popular tax incentive. A
recent article in The New York Times included a poll showing that
about 90 percent of Americans support the mortgage interest
deduction.214 However, that support likely reflects the public’s lack of
key information about the deduction. Many Americans probably do not
know that the mortgage interest deduction decreases revenue by
hundreds of billions of dollars each year, that the expenditure is
212. Under the AMT, acquisition indebtedness is deductible but home equity
indebtedness is not.
213. See, e.g., Kristen McGovern Painter, Note, There’s No Place Like Home:
Projections on the Fate of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction and the Alternative
Minimum Tax in Light of Consumer Behavior, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 295,
329 (2007) (those who favor limiting the mortgage interest deduction “should also
realize that Americans are not willing to sacrifice their preferences, such as luxury
vacation homes or the ability to take out home equity loans to improve their
residences.”); Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of
Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 178-80 (2005) (“There is strong
democratic appeal in supporting these homeownership tax provisions because,
ultimately, these provisions represent the will of the people of the United States, as
evidenced through the votes of their elected Congressmen. . . . These homeownership
Code provisions are politically sacred and it is likely that without them the Code would
be politically untenable. While academics may debate whether homeownership Code
provisions fit into the Haig-Simons definition of ‘income’ and whether the benefits of
homeownership amount to ‘tax expenditures,’ the answer is ultimately irrelevant
because the existing Code would be politically impossible without these provisions.”).
214. McCabe, supra note 31 (including polls finding that more than 90 percent of
Americans support the mortgage interest deduction and separate polls finding that 72
percent of Republicans and 59 percent of Democrats oppose efforts to eliminate the
deduction); Leonhardt, supra note 25.
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growing, that only 23 percent of Americans receive any benefit from the
mortgage interest deduction,215 that the vast majority of benefits are
enjoyed by the highest income taxpayers, that the mortgage interest
deduction has not increased rates of homeownership and that it likely
has decreased the affordability of housing. For an issue this expensive,
the mortgage interest deduction has received little critical debate.
The lack of scrutiny, by politicians and the public, evidences
another flaw of the mortgage interest deduction. As a tax expenditure,
rather than a direct expenditure, the mortgage interest deduction is more
difficult for the public to understand and is dangerously insulated from
an appropriations process that might otherwise expose its flaws. Direct
subsidies are politically responsive because they “are continually being
assessed as to their effectiveness (in terms of achieving objectives),
efficiency (in terms of cost-benefit relationships), equity (in terms of
social welfare achieved), and overall priority (in terms of a proper
allocation of resources).”216 Each year, a budget must be written in
which various direct expenditures come under fire and must be balanced
against multiple proposed alternative uses of available funds. Unlike
direct expenditures, tax expenditures do not go through a direct
appropriations process each year. “They continue and often expand with
no congressional vote.”217
In her 2010 Annual Report to Congress, the National Taxpayer
Advocate observed that while tax expenditure programs are similar to
direct spending programs in terms of their impact on beneficiaries,218
215.
216.

Leonhardt, supra note 25.
Stanley Surrey & Paul McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current
Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 287-88 (1979).
217. Tax Policy Briefing Book, A Citizens’ Guide for the 2008 Election and Beyond,
TAX POLICY CENTER, I-8-6 (last visited Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter
.org/briefing-book/TPC_briefingbook_full.pdf; Section 6 – Evaluating the
Administration of Tax Expenditures, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV. - 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS – VOLUME ONE, 104 (May 11, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/vol_1_msp_6_15_taxpayerrights.pdf [hereinafter TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT
SECTION 6] (“Tax expenditures continue to proliferate, yet measures of their
effectiveness are lacking. Approximately one quarter of government spending consists
of tax expenditures.”).
218. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT INTRO, supra note 10, at 9 n.37 (“When
Congress wishes to spend money, it may do so in either of two ways. It can make
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impact on the deficit and policy goals, “the effect of tax expenditures in
achieving these goals is rarely studied.”219 She specifically called out the
ineffectiveness of the mortgage interest deduction as an example of how
tax expenditures are not sufficiently scrutinized. As she explained, “a
major justification for the home mortgage interest deduction has been a
‘desire to encourage homeownership.’ However, economic research has
shown that the deduction ‘does little if anything to encourage
homeownership. Instead it serves mainly to raise the price of housing
and land and to encourage people who do buy homes to borrow more
and to buy bigger homes than they otherwise would.’”220
A key lesson from the long-standing failure of the mortgage interest
deduction is that incentivizing behavior through tax expenditures
insulates those incentives from political scrutiny. This insulation is
extremely risky. In contrast to direct expenditures, the mortgage interest
deduction has felt to the public and politicians like a benefit they receive
expenditures directly via cash outlays, or it can make expenditures by providing tax
breaks through the tax code. This latter category of spending is referred to as ‘tax
expenditures.’ A tax expenditure is essentially any reduction in income tax liability that
results from an exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or a credit,
preferential tax rate or deferral of tax. As a practical matter, a tax expenditure has the
same impact as a government spending program. Assume that an individual facing a 25
percent tax rate pays $10,000 in mortgage interest and that the government wants to
provide a subsidy for homeownership. It could accomplish this objective in two ways:
(1) it could allow the taxpayer to deduct the $10,000 of mortgage interest from his gross
income, which would produce a tax reduction of $2,500, or (2) it could make a direct
payment of $2,500 to the taxpayer in lieu of the tax deduction. The taxpayer ends up in
the same economic position either way.”). Note, however, that this example assumes
the taxpayer is already itemizing his deductions. If not, the value of the mortgage
interest deduction will be less than $2500 because the taxpayer will have to forego the
standard deduction in order to qualify for the mortgage interest deduction.
219. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT SECTION 6, supra note 217, at 107 (“Tax
expenditures are similar to spending programs in their impact on the deficit; and like
spending, are established to achieve specific national objectives. However, the effect of
tax expenditures in achieving these goals is rarely studied.”).
220. Id. at 118 (citing Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1171); 2005 PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY PANEL; NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE
MOMENT OF TRUTH: REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
REFORM 30-31 (Dec. 2010), http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/news/moment-truthreport-national-commission-fiscal-responsibility-and-reform (recommending reduction
of the mortgage interest deduction).
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for nothing. In fact, it has cost billions of dollars in lost revenue each
year. It is hard to conceive of why the mortgage interest deduction,
which is well supported by broad special interests and the highestincome taxpayers, should qualify for such undemocratic special
treatment. Rather, the use of direct expenditures for housing
consumption exposes these incentives to far greater public and political
debate. Similarly, first-time homebuyer tax credits that include
expiration dates would be democratically tested each time they were
extended.
There are certainly critics who will say that even if Americans were
fully informed about its cost and impacts, they would continue to
support the mortgage interest deduction because of their overwhelming
belief that homeownership is the American Dream. However,
Americans recently experienced a huge housing bubble that sparked a
collapse not only of the housing market, but of economic markets
generally. The recent economic crisis has appropriately led Americans
to question, largely for the first time, their assumptions regarding
homeownership. In the first quarter of 2011, a majority of Americans,
66 percent, believed that homeownership was a safe investment.221
While still high, that number represents a significant decline. In 2003,
83 percent of Americans believed that homeownership was a safe
investment. This reflects a 17 percent decline in eight years.222 Younger
Americans are the least likely to see homeownership as a safe
investment, indicating that a further decline in attitudes about
homeownership might be coming.223 The economic crisis has taught us
that homeownership is not as safe an investment as we previously
believed, meaning that now may be a time of relative openness to
considering new policies. Further, even those Americans who still
strongly believe in the value of homeownership should be open to

221. FANNIE MAE, FACT SHEET: FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY KEY
FINDINGS FIRST QUARTER 1 (May 11, 2011), http://www.fanniemae.com/media
/pdf/2011/Housing-Survey-Fact-Sheet-q12011.pdf.
222. Id.
223. FANNIE MAE, PRESENTATION ABOUT NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY slide 119
(May 11, 2011), http://www.fanniemae.com/media/survey/index.jhtml (follow
“Presentation About National Housing Survey” hyperlink) (thirty-six percent of
Generation Y survey participants described buying a home as a risky investment).
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arguments that alternative policies will be far better at achieving higher
rates of homeownership.
Other critics will point to the self-interest of the large number of
Americans who enjoy the benefit of the mortgage interest deduction or
believe that they will enjoy this benefit in the future as a barrier to
repeal. Accounting for the human tendency to believe that our extreme
prosperity is just around the next turn, many Americans will support the
mortgage interest deduction either because they are rich or because they
believe that they will become rich.224 However, recent polling indicates
that Americans do not intentionally support housing subsidies for the
wealthy. As a recent New York Times article explained, “[t]he mortgage
interest deduction benefits the set of households that Americans think
are least deserving of federal homeownership subsidies. Twenty-six
percent of respondents in the Times/CBS poll prefer that low-income
homebuyers benefit from federally subsidized home loans. Twenty-four
percent prefer that all homebuyers reap the rewards, regardless of their
income. And 15 percent believe that middle-class Americans should be
the beneficiaries of federal subsidies for homeownership. Although
wealthy Americans disproportionately benefit from the mortgage
interest deduction, only 1 percent of Americans believe high-income
homebuyers should receive federally subsidized home loans.”225 The
mortgage interest deduction subsidizes home loans for the group of
taxpayers that Americans least want to subsidize.
Certainly critics can dispute the relevance of this polling data,
noting that it is easy to check a box indicating support for the poor while
it is much more difficult to forgo actual financial benefit in favor of the
poor. With that acknowledged, however, the American public has put its
money where its mouth is on the subject of housing policy. In the
politically-responsive direct expenditure process, incentives for
homeownership generally are not aimed at benefiting high-income
citizens, but provide significant benefits to low-income citizens, middleincome citizens and citizens from certain defined service classes

224. This human tendency is often cited as a reason why many Americans oppose
the estate tax even though it applies only to the extremely wealthy.
225. McCabe, supra note 31.
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(including veterans).226 If the mortgage interest deduction was a direct
spending item rather than a tax expenditure program, it is hard to
imagine that it would receive such high rates of public and political
support. “It is difficult to conceive of a defense for a direct spending
program that would pay nearly 40% of the cost of a second home for a
millionaire227 while providing no benefit to the average family making
less than $42,500.”228 Were the cost, distribution and effect of the
mortgage interest deduction more widely known, support for the
deduction likely would erode.
Finally, despite the widespread public support for the mortgage
interest deduction, the deficit crisis has put it on the political chopping
block. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform
(commonly known as Bowles-Simpson) proposed a significant
reduction to the size and value of the mortgage interest deduction. Under
its proposal, mortgage interest would receive a 12 percent credit (rather
than a deduction at the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate, which is
currently up to 35 percent), interest would be deductible only up to a
mortgage cap of $500,000 and the interest on mortgages for second
homes would no longer be deductible.229 While the Bowles-Simpson
recommendations did not receive the necessary votes to reach Congress,
the mortgage interest deduction is now being challenged by other
politicians.
The current administration has proposed reductions to the mortgage
interest deduction. In a speech on April 13, 2011, President Barack
Obama explained that we must “reduce spending in the tax code . . . the
226. See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 61, at 1175 (“real federal spending for lowincome housing rose substantially between 1970 and 2005.”).
227. This estimate is a bit high. The highest marginal income tax rate for 2012 is 35
percent. In the first year of a thirty-year-fixed-rate mortgage, most (but not all) of
payments are interest. Thus, a more accurate current estimate is that the mortgage
interest deduction pays about 25 percent of the mortgage payment made by a
millionaire on his second home unless that millionaire is subject to the alternative
minimum tax.
228. William Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 62 (1998).
229. The Moment of Truth, REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, 31 (Dec. 2010), http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites
/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
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tax code is loaded up with spending on things like itemized deductions.
And while I agree with the goals of many of these deductions, like
homeownership and charitable giving, we cannot ignore the fact that
they provide millionaires with an average tax break of $75,000 while
doing nothing for the typical middle-class family that doesn’t
itemize.”230 President Obama has proposed capping the value of
itemized deductions (including the mortgage interest deduction) for
single taxpayers with more than $200,000 annual income and married
couples with more than $250,000 combined annual income.231 Under his
proposal, the value of all itemized deductions would be capped at 28
percent, rather than the taxpayer’s marginal rate.232
Finally, in a July 2011 report, the bipartisan deficit reduction panel
commonly known as The Gang of Six, also recommended cuts to the
mortgage interest deduction.233 The report used a proposed reduction in
tax expenditures to fund elimination of the alternative minimum tax and
reduction in the highest marginal tax rates.234 It received broad political
support235 despite proposing a reduction to the mortgage interest
deduction.
Whether or not the mortgage interest deduction is well-liked by the
public, and therefore by politicians, the current economic climate has
forced many leaders to advocate reducing it. These leaders should
provide the public with information about its cost and effects. Such
information likely would erode public support for the mortgage interest
deduction.

230. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at George Washington
University (Apr. 13, 2011).
231. General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue
Proposals, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 131 (Feb. 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/res
ource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Final%20Greenbook%20Feb%202012.pdf.
232. Id. at 132.
233. Stephen Ohlemacher, ‘Gang of Six’ Debt Deal Targets Mortgage Deduction,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 20, 2011, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html
/businesstechnology/2015676503_debt21.html.
234. Id.
235. John Nichols, “Gang of Six” Plan? “Not So Fast” Says Bernie Sanders, THE
NATION THE BEAT BLOG, July 19, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/blog/162166/gangsix-plan-not-so-fast-says-bernie-sanders (“[T]he cheerleading for the “Gang of Six”
plan is considerable and enthusiastic.”).
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CONCLUSION
The mortgage interest deduction is widely believed to be America’s
favorite tax deduction. Instead of carefully evaluating its effectiveness,
politicians pledge allegiance to the American dream of homeownership
and continue this incentive. Unfortunately, the failure to evaluate its
effectiveness has been a costly oversight. The mortgage interest
deduction costs nearly $120 billion annually in lost revenue. Yet
international comparisons, interstate comparisons, time comparisons and
economic projections show that the mortgage interest deduction fails to
promote homeownership. Instead, it inflates housing prices, encourages
excessive borrowing and contributes to instability in the real estate
economy.
The housing bubble of 2006, and the economic collapse that
followed it, provide a window of opportunity and the current deficit
crisis provides a necessary motivation to repeal the mortgage interest
deduction. While many Americans still believe that homeownership is a
valuable goal, their belief has recently and dramatically weakened. For
the first time in years, many Americans have experienced losses in their
home values and some have experienced the tragedy of foreclosure. In
truth, the mortgage interest deduction did not cause them to purchase
their homes, did not help them stay in their homes, inflated an
unsustainable housing bubble and contributed to a damaging bust in the
real estate market. Instead of perpetuating this costly and ineffective
incentive, Congress should repeal it in its entirety. Congress should
replace the mortgage interest deduction with targeted, marketresponsive, time-limited homebuyer tax credits that avoid the failures of
the mortgage interest deduction.

